Stealing Dynamics in Razz

Disclaimer: Just a reminder that I am a decidedly non-expert Razz player, so take this post as my attempting to muddle through a somewhat unfamiliar game with my general poker knowledge rather than a confident statement of sound Razz strategy.

Villain is a well-known Australian pro, a very successful tournament player whose specialty is NLHE but whom I’ve often encountered in non-hold ’em games and surely has a better idea of what he’s doing than I do.

PokerStars Hand #121971038991: Tournament #948919234, $500+$30 USD Razz Limit – Level IX (300/600) – 2014/09/23 17:04:54 ET
Table ‘948919234 12′ 8-max
Seat 1: AceSpades11 (6520 in chips)
Seat 2: V-MAX261 (14197 in chips)
Seat 3: thegosu2 (4974 in chips)
Seat 4: kalthor (6978 in chips)
Seat 5: Koziammo (13562 in chips)
Seat 6: dimmmmi1 (7353 in chips)
Seat 7: Andy McLEOD (13680 in chips)
Seat 8: foucault82 (8505 in chips)

*** 3rd STREET ***
Dealt to AceSpades11 [Qs]
Dealt to V-MAX261 [2s]
Dealt to thegosu2 [Jh]
Dealt to kalthor [8h]
Dealt to Koziammo [6d]
Dealt to dimmmmi1 [Tc]
Dealt to Andy McLEOD [5c]
Dealt to foucault82 [5h Qc 2h]
AceSpades11: brings in for 90
V-MAX261: folds
thegosu2: folds
kalthor: folds
Koziammo: folds
dimmmmi1: folds
Andy McLEOD: raises 210 to 300
foucault82: calls 300
AceSpades11: folds
*** 4th STREET ***
Dealt to Andy McLEOD [5c] [9h]
Dealt to foucault82 [5h Qc 2h] [7s]
foucault82: bets 300
Andy McLEOD: calls 300
*** 5th STREET ***
Dealt to Andy McLEOD [5c 9h] [5s]
Dealt to foucault82 [5h Qc 2h 7s] [Ks]
foucault82: bets 600
Andy McLEOD: raises 600 to 1200
foucault82: calls 600
*** 6th STREET ***
Dealt to Andy McLEOD [5c 9h 5s] [Js]
Dealt to foucault82 [5h Qc 2h 7s Ks] [3c]
foucault82: bets 600
Andy McLEOD: calls 600
*** RIVER ***
Dealt to foucault82 [5h Qc 2h 7s Ks 3c] [4s]
foucault82: checks
Andy McLEOD: bets 600
foucault82: raises 600 to 1200
Andy McLEOD: calls 600
*** SHOW DOWN ***
foucault82: shows [5h Qc 2h 7s Ks 3c 4s] (Lo: 7,5,4,3,2)
Andy McLEOD: mucks [2c 8s 5c 9h 5s Js As] (Lo: 9,8,5,2,A)
foucault82 collected 7770 from pot

If you look at the situation on 3rd street, the action folds to him with just a 2 and a Q behind him. Between the antes and the bring-in, there’s 570 in the pot, and his raise risks 300 to steal it. That means that between myself and the bring-in, we need to defend at least two-thirds of the time to make Andy indifferent from raising with any two down cards.

Because I’m showing a 2 while the bring-in is showing a Queen, my range is much stronger than his and consequently the majority of that burden falls on me. To keep it simple, let’s just say that I need to defend twice as many hands as he, or about 44%.

There are four As, four 3s, four 4s, three 5s, three 6s, four 7s, three 8s, and three 9s left among the 44 unexposed cards. Thus the odds are (28/44) * (20/43) ~ 36% that I’ll have three to a 9 when I’m showing a 2. There’s an additional (15/44) * (18/43) ~ 14% chance that I’ll two cards to a wheel plus a T or worse. Playing all of those hands to the raise would have me defending 50%, which is a bit too much.

I’m not entirely sure whether calling with a Q and a wheel card is worse than calling with a pair and a wheel card (in which case I’d block a strong card from the opener’s range), and I don’t think I need to do both. So it’s possible that this should be a fold on third, but I think it’s close.

Perhaps you can see where this is going. Much as in hold ’em, we’re going to end up with an aggressive late position dynamic here where all players have a lot of incentive to play marginal hands.

My bet on fourth street is mandatory. Even though Andy has not caught a complete brick, he may fold now if I caught him stealing a particularly weak hand or if the 9 paired him, and even if he does not fold I have 37% equity against four to a 9.

It’s possible that I err in betting fifth street. When we both brick, my equity drops to 30%, and Andy is savvy enough to recognize that I probably two-bet the better hands in my range on third street, which means that if he actually has four to a 9, especially when he pairs a baby, there’s a good chance he’s ahead, and he raises for value. I have to call. Weaker Razz players won’t raise here but may bet when checked to, which makes betting much more attractive against them.

After catching well on 6th, I’m a slight favorite and can bet.

Even though I make a lock hand on the river, I check because I know he’s drawing. Although he will check some hands that would call a bet, I also think he’ll bluff some bricks and bet some worse hands for value.

I’m curious about his river bet. I probably have to call no matter what, because of how easily he could make two-pair, but if he’s going to pay off a check-raise, then he loses two bets when I improve as opposed to rarely winning more than one when I do not (occasionally he picks off a check-raise bluff). He can assume that I have four to at least a 97, and against his board I can confidently raise any 8, so without crunching the numbers, my hunch is that he needs to assume I’m betting some of my stronger hands on the river to make bet-calling a 98 a good idea.

3 thoughts on “Stealing Dynamics in Razz”

  1. Hey Andrew,

    As I said on twitter, this is a really interesting hand and should give players a lot to think about. Too much to cover in a couple of tweets anyway! I’ll comment on the hand in a linear order (from 3rd to 5th) but readers should bear in mind that what’s likely to happen later in the hand (Hero may spew, Villain may spew, Hero may value raise with the nuts, Villain may make a loose call, etc) will have some effect on the line you should take on early streets. I’ll look closer at 6th and 7th when I have more time.

    3rd st: You’ve set up your analysis based on GTO frequency to make Villain indifferent to raising or folding. I’m a big believer in the value of GTO play (unlike certain razz bracelet winners), but I see 2 fallacies in your argument:

    1) Your goal shouldn’t be to try to deny Villain a +EV play, but to maximize your own EV. Even if we assume this is a zero sum game (no rake, and only cEV applies since stacks are relatively deep and you’re probably far from the bubble), there is dead money in the pot due to all the players who have folded already. So for the remaining players it’s possible for an equilibrium to exist in which 2 (or even all 3) players come out with +EV. It’s also possible that if Villain doesn’t play an optimal strategy that Hero can do better than optimal by exploiting him. Of course, Hero’s EV will always be exactly 0 if he folds.

    2) If you extend your analysis to include the EV of Hero restealing, you’ll see that you’d be risking 600 to win 870, requiring Villain to call 59% of the time for Hero to be indifferent to raising or folding. This means that Villain’s playing range would have to basically be all 3-card 9’s or better, and any 7 or better plus any T or worse in the hole. Do you think he will call or 3-bet all of that range? If not, you have a +EV resteal.

    4th: I agree your bet is mandatory, but I don’t expect you to have much fold equity given your flat on 3rd (you may gets Qs and worse to fold). It’s better than a xc however, since that will certainly cap your range and offer Villain a free card when he’s behind.

    5th: Leading is definitely an error here. Your board still isn’t scary enough to tell a story of strength after you showed weakness on 3rd. Also, not only do you have 30% equity vs. his actual hand, but you have 51% vs. a totally random hand and 35% vs. his likely range of a draw to a J or better (see why it was useful to cap his 4th st range?). Try to remember that we don’t play against specific hands, we play against our opponent’s range. There’s a podcast I listen to fairly regularly that keeps preaching this concept, maybe you should check it out? 😉

    • Thanks, Dan, really appreciate your taking the time to write this up. The point you make about raising vs calling especially hit home for me, but I learned a lot from this.

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