I know I’m a little to the party, but for my take on Mark Newhouse’s infamous main event bustout hand, check out the latest issue of Two Plus Two Magazine:
“Antonio Esfandiari, who was providing commentary for ESPN while the hand went down, said “He put his opponent on a hand and played accordingly. That’s how you win at no-limit hold ’em.”
I respectfully disagree. What does it mean to “play accordingly” when you have TT and you put your opponent on QQ? If you know he will fold, then bluffing would be correct. If you know he won’t fold, then giving up and checking and/or folding would be correct. What if you don’t know what he’ll do?
The fact that Newhouse was attempting to bluff Tonking off of hands barely better than his own, and even moreso the fact that Tonking called, indicate that someone made a theoretical mistake at some point in the hand.”
I not only analyze the hand in depth but also make some broader points about how and when to use game theory in tournament situations where ICM considerations have a huge influence on the correct play. Given the scope of the article, it’s going to be spread over two issues, so the one that’s out now is Part 1.
I read that newhouse was a severe problem child at home . Screamed at his parents never had interest in school or finding a job just poker I read somewhere he once went into a rage ad a teen knocked over a book case dat down and held his head
You put into words what we all been thinking.
Seems that this was a really short part 1. Looking forward to part 2…
Andrew, your arguments are sharp ( Tonking 72%,ICM,skill gap).
Antonio statement is very true from his own perspective.
Top NL holdem players put opponents on a hand- their intuition (not ego) tell them to disregard ICM,poker theory,etc to get max.
There is always fragile balance between ego and intuition.
Where was Newhouse intuition?.
Long time before the hand he was at the center the media spotlight because of his unbelievable feat.
The odds of reaching consecutive final tables in 2013 and 2014 were 1 in 524,079.
I suspect that after such feat and very intense media spotlight your ego tells you that you are the master of the poker universe
So ego takes driver seat for your decision process.
The sport arena gives even more spectacular examples of such transformations and consequences.
It’s a remarkable hand because of the metagame considerations. Newhouse’s tweet, “Not fucking finishing 9th again”, and the media coverage surrounding his back-to-backs, gives Tonking lots of (mis)information to help him find a fold here. Newhouse is trying a leverage play, and runs into the top end of Tonking’s check-calling range. It was a bold shove, but as you will no doubt show in part 2, demonstrably incorrect.
Yeah I address some of those meta-considerations in Part 2. In short, my argument is that there are some that cut in the opposite direction, and also there’s the old problem of “What if Tonking thinks Newhouse will think that that tweet will generate some additional fold equity for him?”
When I talked that hand over with other players the conclusion I came to was that it was really hard to find (m)any Jacks in Newhouse’s range. Newhouse:
1-flatted a raise
2-called a OOP 3bet from a tight player.
He just basically never has AJ or KJ or QJ there. His range is super narrow…its basically 88-TT, maybe AQs, and the only Jack you can find in there is JJ.
I don’t agree with that. I think JTs – AJs at the very least would play this way, and quite possibly AJo as well.
I have a hard time seeing QJs-KJs calling a 3 bet for HU play that looks legit. JTs might be more likely. i dont really see AJ calling often either.
I think AJo would be the most defensible fold of the three, and I don’t think it makes sense for JTs to call but not QJs or KJs. I really can’t see him folding any of those three getting 2.5:1 in position.
I didn’t think it was the pre-flop call so much as the turn bet that took a lot of jacks out of his range.
I think it’s quite plausible that he makes the pre-flop call with hands like QJs, KJs etc – however, wouldn’t most of those hands check back the turn an appreciable percentage of the time? When he bets the turn, therefore, I think medium ack-type hands become a good bit less likely and QQ becomes an easier call.
If Newhouse checks the turn and then moves in on the river (or pots it) with a much bigger bet, a J becomes much more plausible, I think, and it’s possible he gets Tonking to fold.
(Admittedly that line of argument would also suggest that he should check back 10-10 on the turn much of the time too, and he didn’t, so maybe my assumptions are all wrong.)
Really nice analysis and explanation. It’s quite amazing how ICM can affect calling/folding frequencies. I vaguely recall that Tonking said “I snap-call in a cashgame”, and I believed him.
Esfandiari’s analysis seemed pretty bad on many hands, it has to be said, and I thought Newhouse basically lost his mind on the final table, but it’s very easy to criticize from this distance.
I’m looking forward to part 2.