Timestamps

0:30 Hello & Welcome
38:31 Strategy

Strategy

$5/$10 NLHE, $3000 effective stacks. UTG opens to $50, Hero calls 9d 7d UTG1, SB and BB call.

Flop ($200) 6h 5s 4c. Check, check, UTG bets $100, everyone calls.

Turn ($600) 8h. Three checks, Hero bets $300, SB raises to $1000, two folds, Hero shoves, SB calls.

action is limped by1 player(B) to Button that raises to $25, folds to BB and he re pops it for $85 total… now here is the question, given a hero read of extremely strong ranges on at the very least the BB and quite possibly the Button, isn’t this in fact a call as opposed to a fold even though we know we are probably behind?

let me lay out some thoughts… if we perceive a squeeze by a single player, this is certainly a raise in position… however, we’re playing against an initial raiser that is still left to act behind us after we potentially make the call.

Here is where I diverge from my fellow players… I submit that I can logically make this call at times because given my read, I am fairly certain that these two players have potentially very strong hands… strong enough to carry on with the action post flop given a non threatening board. I think this is extremely important component because in order to carry on in this hand, we’re going to need to impose very strong implied odds to make this call profitable given a set’s roughly 8:1 odds. We’ve already dropped $5 on this pot and we’re going to need implied odds of at least +8:1 in order to make this mathematically break even… so roughly another $640 behind(which we have as there is a total of 890 effective left in A/C stacks). I realize that most players use a 10:1 ratio in order to comfortably make a set mine profitable, but I had said to my friends, that I might even be willing to go to $100 in this situation(or perhaps even $125 if the SB had re-popped for the initial raise-$25 and a stack of red-$100).

To the man, they say there is no way I should be making this play and this is a pure fold, no questions asked.

Certainly, I would NOT make this play 100% of the time in my personal game as the implied odds are very close to break even and not sustainable/positive expectation… however, I contest that I can make this Pre-Flop Float at times given my read of V(s)strength, and very close to even implied odds.

A. Hi, thanks for the question dealing with the often-tricky problem of calculating implied odds and set mining. Your instinct about generally being more inclined to call given strong ranges for your opponents is correct. Nonetheless, I would fold here.

The single biggest reason is that you are not closing the action. If you believe SB has a very strong range, strong enough to count on stacking him with any regularity when you flop a set, then you must also fear the possibility that he will raise again. So you may not get to see the flop for $80.

Even if you were closing the action, though, some problems remain. One reason that many players, including myself, use a rule of thumb of needing a 10-to-1 average return (which is not the same as merely having ten times your investment between the pot and the remaining stacks) is that a set will not win 100% of the time, particularly not against two players.

I’m not sure I understand what you’re saying in the final paragraph. If the call isn’t positive expectation, then you shouldn’t make it ever. If it is, then you should always make it. I don’t see any cause for a mixed strategy in this situation.

In short, it’s important to recognize that the 10-to-1 rule already represents extremely generous assumptions. You can’ t discount it further on the grounds that your opponents have strong ranges, particularly when you aren’t closing the action. In fact I just posted a similar hand where I folded TT pre-flop despite putting my opponent on an extremely strong range.

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Strangely, it seems to me that set mining in a 3-bet pot has better prospects. Say now UTG has 22 and button 3-bets to 12 with AA. Button can’t pot control with AA in a 3-bet pot so UTG EV is 10% of 112 less 2% of 96.5 or about 9 compared to the additional outlay of 8.5. Of course 3-bettor does not always have a hand to stack off with but if they are going to check-fold a significant number of flops then this might make up the difference. But everybody writes that shouldn’t call 3-bets with 22 – 77 and even with 88 it is necessary to bluff raise or float to make it profitable.

After playing a little on-line I am trying to develop some basic strategy for opening, calling, 3-betting etc. Trying to reconcile all the conflicting opinions and get it to make GTO sense is making my head spin!

A: Very good question. Your first instinct is correct: it’s not profitable to play a pure set-mining strategy (meaning you give up 100% of the time that you don’t flop a set) against a player capable of pot controlling and/or getting away from strong one-pair hands such as overpairs. Sometimes you’ll flop a set and he’ll have nothing, sometimes you’ll flop a set but win only a medium-sized pot, and sometimes you’ll flop a set but lose anyway. There may even be circumstances where you flop a set and end up folding to a bluff (ie you hold 55 on a 5d 6d 7d board and he triple barrels Ad K or something). The point is that, as you say, the implied odds aren’t there unless your opponent simply can’t fold a strong pair no matter how obvious that he’s beat. A few things follow from this.

Against a player who can fold a hand like AA, you should sometimes represent a set when you don’t have one (though not necessarily with a whiffed small pair). Suited connectors or other draws are generally the best candidates for doing so. This general strategy actually goes all the way back to Doyle Brunson’s Super/System: play your draws aggressively, and you’ll either get lots of fold equity with them or get more action for sets and other big hands (or ideally both). My recent mailbag post about suited connectors, which was actually the impetus for this question, may be of some help with this.

Secondly, you can’t afford to fold every time you miss a set. The more resilient your pair is unimproved, however, the more you can justify calling with a strategy that sees most of your value coming from sets but some coming also from picking off a bluff or two and/or running a bluff of your own. This, I assume, is why you distinguish small pairs (22 – 55) from the larger ones; the larger your pair, the more boards there will be where you can profitably call a bet or three. My recent mailbag post about chasing a gut shot explains the more complicated implied odds involved in such a calculation.

The important thing to remember is that your opponent isn’t a god. If you have the advantage of position, then he shouldn’t be able to win the pot every time you don’t flop a set but also get away cheaply every time you do. If he bluffs a lot, you’ll call down unimproved more often, sometimes losing to bigger pairs but overall showing a profit. If he gives up big hands to resistance, then you’ll give up pocket pairs unimproved but bluff often with a different set of hands. And if he simply doesn’t give up, then you can indeed show a profit purely with set mining.

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This is the hand :
Blinds 250/500 ante 60.
Hero is the CO with AcTs.
utg folds.
utg +1 : folds.
CO (21 000):raises to 1000.
btn : folds.
SB: (53 000) : calls.
BB (34 000): calls.

pot: 3 180.

flop : QsJh4s

SB: bets 1400
BB: calls
CO : ?

All the debate is here. All we know about the SB and the BB is that they are categorized as fishs.
One commentator think the call can be EV+ and the other is not agree with that.
The two arguments for the call are :
1. SB shows some strength with his donk bet, the board hit his hand very often, so if the turn is a king (but not the spade one) the implied odds are huge and hero think he can stack off SB.
2. hero thinks that an ace on the turn can be a good out for him, because on a multiway pot, players play more tight and with the position hero can know very quickly if his ace is good.

The arguments for fold is :
With only 3 outs in front off 2 strong ranges it is not EV+ to call.

I think the fold is ok, but I think the arguments for the call are interesting, and I want to know if it is something that you think about when you have a decision to take in a multiway pot ?

A: Good question. This is actually a complicated situation for calculating implied odds on future streets, because there are so many possibilities. I’ll come back to all of that in a moment. In spots like this, I think it makes sense to start by looking at the scenario where you expect the bulk of your profit to come from. Once you figure out how close that gets you to profitability, then you can look at how much the more marginal situations will affect your equity, for better or worse.

In this case, we’re mostly banking on the implied odds of turning the nuts. Three cards – the non-spade kings – will do that for you. You have a roughly 6% chance of turning three outs, which means you need to get about 17:1 between immediate and implied odds to break-even on the call if you were simply to fold on any other turn card. Calling costs you 1400, so you’d need to average a return of 22,400 the times that you turn the nuts to make up for all the times you call, miss, and fold. Will you?

There’s just about 6000 in the pot, so that’s another 16,400 you need in implied odds. You’ll have 18,600 left in your stack after calling the flop, so you’d have to get all-in (and win – don’t forget that hands stacking off to you will likely be sets, two-pair, and flush draws that will have anywhere from 8% to 18% equity against your straight) more than 88% of the time to break-even if you were solely playing to make the nuts or fold.

That’s a high number, even against two suspected fish. We won’t be able to come up with an actual number with any accuracy, so let’s just keep in mind that we’ve got some equity to make up in other scenarios.

There are some other ways in which you stand to show a profit. Occasionally the turn will be a spade and your opponents will show sufficient weakness for you to steal the pot. Even if you don’t win an additional bet, you’ll win the pot relatively often on the Ks. You might get to see the river for free, doubling your chances of making the nuts without any additional investment. An A could give you the best hand and perhaps even another value bet.

Of course none of these scenarios is 100%. Sometimes an A or the Ks will actually cost you a bet. Anyone slowplaying a turned flush might induce you to bluff. You’re in position and, presumably, have a skill edge, though, so on balance these scenarios should shake out in your favor.

Again, it’s hard to estimate exactly how much these scenarios will improve your equity. Thus, we’re left the same dilemma. You have good implied odds, but almost certainly not enough to justify calling, based on the possibility of turning the nuts alone. There are some other ways you could pick up some equity, but it’s hard to say how much or whether it would be enough to make calling the flop show a profit.

In short, it’s a close decision, just as you and the video producers have already determined. In a tournament, especially with two weak players who cover me on my right, I’d rather fold than risk a significant percentage of my stack in a marginal spot.

I’d feel better about calling if we had a more clear plan for exploiting one or both of these players. If we were sure one of them had two-pair or would lose his ass with any pair, then I’d like calling for the better implied odds. Likewise if we could be sure neither had a flush draw and that we’d have very good bluffing opportunities if a spade fell, then I’d like calling for the bluff outs (which are really a kind of implied odds).

I’m skeptical of generic plans simply to “outplay” someone later, though, which is essentially what we’d be banking on by calling here. In a tournament where Hero seems to have an appreciable skill edge, I’d rather avoid trying to catch the fish in such murky waters. There will be more clearly profitable opportunities.

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Hand Reading Made Simple– By far my requested article ever, this one outlines a simple method for categorizing an opponent’s hand as strong, marginal, or weak/drawing. It also explores some of the applications of this information in common no-limit hold ’em situations.

Debunking Myths About Implied Odds– This poker theory article offers some new thinking about one of the most important concepts in big bet poker, especially no-limit hold ’em, and debunks some common misunderstandings and mistakes.

Relative Hand Strength– This is one of the most advanced concepts I’ve ever explored in writing. It’s about learning to think about your hand solely with regard to its equity relative to your opponent’s range rather than how highly it ranks in the hierarchy of possible poker hands.

Real Time Equity– This article is full of practical advice for equity-based decision-making in the heat of the moment. Sure, playing around with Poker Stove between sessions can be illuminating, but how do you figure out how much equity you have when the pressure’s on and you have just seconds to decide if you will raise, call, or fold?

2009 World Series of Poker trip report- For the first time in my poker career, I didn’t cash in the WSOP main event, but I did make it to Day 3 and play alongside Luca Pagano, Isaac Baron, and cricket legend Shane Warne.

“Calling a late position raise with a suited connector when you have the button is a good example [of implied odds that don’t depend on making a strong hand]. Since the pre-flop raiser probably has a wide and not particularly strong range, you can’t count on winning a big pot on the rare occasions that you make two pair or better. Because his range is so wide, though, you will often be able to steal the pot when you flop a weak draw or even a scary board texture. Whether you want to call it implied odds, bluff equity, or something else, this is as much a justification for taking slightly the worst of it on an early street as is drawing at a monster hand.”

Read more about this and other misunderstood aspects of implied odds in the 2+2 Magazine!