The Case For Folding

This is the least appealing option, and in practice I probably just wouldn’t sit in a game where the conditions that would cauto pse me to fold this would be likely to arise. Against two top-notch opponents, and especially with more tough opponents behind you, I’d fold. Even under these conditions, deeper stacks could compel me to call or three-bet, but with these stacks you need an appreciable post-flop edge that is not merely positional because you figure to be in bad shape against their ranges for entering the pot in such early position. Thankfully, we are not playing against such players, and against weaker opponents this is exactly the sort of hand you want to use to exploit their mistakes.

The Case For Calling

UTG is the mark at the table, and we’d like to play pots with him. Calling gives us the best chance of bringing him along and keeps the stacks nice and deep which maximizes our positional advantage.

Gareth and others make the important point that the risk of a squeeze from someone behind could take a bite out of the profitability of calling, but I agree with Aldune that, “Generally I would never worry about getting squeezed in a 2/5 game. This happens way too infrequently for it to a decisive factor in this hand.” It’s worth asking whether someone behind you will make this play with a good frequency, but the answer will usually be no.

Several commenters shared Piers’ concern that “[the raiser’s] range has us crushed so much of the time you’d have to be concerned about calling his c-bet on a T or Q high flop.” Even if his range really is that strong, though, position can help us to navigate these treacherous waters, though. For instance, if we have a read that UTG2 won’t continuation bet a whiffed Ace-King into multiple callers, then we can fold to a bet even if hit top pair without any redraws, but we can also count on stealing a lot of pots when checked to. Otherwise, it will probably be safe to peel one when we flop top pair and fold to further action from him.

As for UTG, Mh says, ” I expect the loose UTG to check/call the flop most of the time.” This is a common misconception about loose players. A player who sees the flop with an excessively wide and weak range is actually going to check and fold a lot of flops (or, if he doesn’t, he’ll check and fold a lot of turns). Weak pre-flop ranges turn into weak flop ranges, and even if his standards for what counts as a “fit” are on the low side, he’s still going to have a lot of “folds”.

These players actually end up being very good targets for semi-bluffing, because there comes a point where they have to let go of all of those weak hands. Basically, all of their calling ranges are too wide. They call pre-flop and fold flop often. They call pre-flop and flop and fold turn often. They call to the river and then fold often. And, because their pre-flop ranges are so wide, they still have enough weak hands to call three barrels too often. So you can keep firing with your draws, profit from the many weak hands that will fall by the wayside on each street, and also benefit from their willingness to pay off when you complete your draws.

I discuss this concept in greater detail in How To Bluff a Calling Station.

What you cannot afford to do is try to “set mine” with this hand and expect to profit by being loose and passive. In other words, you can’t call, hope to flop two-pair or a draw, fold when you don’t, play passively when you do, and expect to show enough of a profit on the rare occasions that you actually make a strong hand to make up for all those earlier calls from behind. This is the mistake that Ed Miller calls “playing poker like a slot machine”. If you’re going to play this hand, you need to use your position and your draw equity to push your opponents out when the opportunity arises.

The Case For Raising

Given that you’re anticipating some post-flop aggression, it would be great to get the ball rolling pre-flop. After all, by flatting you take most of the strongest pre-flop hands out of your range, and that makes it harder to represent strength later.

As Piers points out, the big drawbacks to 3-betting are the risks of putting in a lot of money against a very strong range and possibly even being blown out by a 4-bet. Several people correctly mention that 4-bets, like squeezes, are rare in these games, and we can probably assume that UTG2 is not going to 4-bet light. It seems, then, that a lot of the risk of 3-betting could be eliminated if we could exclude the top 5% or so of hands from UTG2’s range.

Brian was the only commenter to mention the possibility of sizing tells, but if we have reason to believe that UTG2 would have made a larger raise with his strongest holdings, then this has the potential to swing a call to a 3-bet. Many people assumed that because this player is described as “bordering on nitty” that he must have a big hand. What would you expect such a player to do with 99 or AJ in this spot? Trying to isolate a loose player with a small raise seems in character.

What about if this same player had AA? The best players will keep their pre-flop sizing consistent so as not to give away information like this, but many people will be tempted to make a larger raise. After all, they can expect UTG to come along even for a larger raise, and many of these players hate getting drawn out on or playing multi-way pots when they have big pairs.

If we’re right about UTG2 capping his range with this raise size, then 3-betting and barreling will be extremely profitable. Only low probability events such as someone behind waking up with a monster or someone calling and flopping a monster should keep us from winning this pot.

Bottom Line

I think a lot of people are overestimating the value of a strategy built around making a huge hand and getting paid by UTG (as I argued before, his looseness doesn’t necessarily translate into auto-stacking him; in fact the opposite may well be true) and not appreciating the value of locking up, with a high probability, the $30 that is already in the pot. I even think that there are further implied odds attached to 3-betting, not just because you will occasionally make a strong hand but because you may well make more money from barreling than from getting folds immediately.

With only 120BB stacks, there’s not a need for a large raise. $50 – $55 should be enough to isolate UTG2 (though if UTG wants to cold call that’s fine too) and set you up for more profitable bluffing later should you get called.

A new post is coming shortly for discussion of flop action.

This question actually comes from the Tournament Poker Edge forums, but I decided to answer it here as it references the Thinking Poker Premium Podcasts.

Q: In episode three, at around the 10 minute mark, you describe how open raise sizes should be a function of the pot size, which in turn means a function of the ante and blind sizes. Then you offer an answer to the question “why do we therefore tend to sometimes 2.5-3x in the very early stages and tend towards minraise at the later stages?” and the answer is that stack sizes come into play, meaning that at the later stages, even though the pot is nice and huge, everyone tends to have significantly less BB in their stack to work with/everyone must protect their stacks more. This makes sense, and you do continue to say that if stack sizes were not hugely different once antes are introduced, you would still open raise with sizing as a function of pot and ante sizes. Do I have this all correct?

If so, my question is – is this a good example of what you describe:

Merge has a structure of “deepstack” turbos where you start at 15/30 and stacks of 5000. By the time you hit 50/100 blinds there is a 10 chip ante and that’s like 20-25 minutes into the game, so lots of players have 50BB stacks. At this stage, would you opt not to open raise to 200-220 and rather go for something like 250 or even 300 in certain positions?

A. Good question. My own thoughts and strategy here are still in flux, and in fact have changed somewhat since recording this series. I don’t think that anything we say in those podcasts is wrong, but there’s a factor we didn’t explicitly consider which is that smaller raises enable you to raise more hands profitably. Especially at a table where I expect a significant post-flop edge, I prefer being able to VPIP more hands, even if means that my opponents can do the same because my raise offers them better odds. So of late I’ve been minraising even with deep stacks.

Ultimately, though, I don’t think it matters that much when stacks are deep. The difference between putting 2 vs 3 BBs in the pot out of a 150BB stack just isn’t that significant, especially if you adjust your ranges accordingly. In other words, your range for 2xing should be wider than your range for 2.5xing which should be wider than your range for 3xing. My assumption/belief/premise is that with smaller raises your EV is lower with your strongest hands, but this can be more than compensated through the EV gained by turning hands that would have to be folded if you used a larger raise size into a +EV opens.

When stacks are shallow, the pre-flop action matters a lot more, and probably you are making a mistake if you aren’t making small raises, especially in situations where people will often shove over your raises. Even there, though, it’s probably still not as big of a deal as people think.

Min-raises ought to be called and 3-bet more often than larger raises. If your opponents don’t respond in this way (and many don’t IMO, especially from the BB), that is all the more reason to use small raises. But if you are continuing to play a very TAG pre-flop strategy, then yes with antes and stacks deep enough that most pots don’t end with someone all in pre-flop you probably want to use a larger raise size than you would with antes and a 25BB average stack size.

If you’d like to hear a better player than I weigh in on this topic, it’s something we discussed with Mike McDonald when he was on the podcast.

Do you have a question for the Thinking Poker Mailbag? Please leave it as a comment below!

First a little history. Villain is a nitty regular, so much so that it’s at least a running joke that he isn’t allowed to participate in time pot arrangements; I’m not sure whether or not that’s actually enforced. (In higher stakes games where players pay a fixed amount every half hour instead of paying rake on every pot, they sometimes agree to take the entire time fee out of the first large pot played. This is nominally to move the game along more quickly but in practice is used to cause loose and unaware players to pay a disproportionate amount of the time fee.)

We previously played a pot where Villain limped UTG, I raised with AJo, and we ended up going four ways to the flop. He bet $100 into $165 on an Ah Th 7c flop, I folded, and he ended up showing AKo.

I had what I think was an intimidating image. I’d won enough pots without showdown that people were rightfully suspicious, but I’d also gotten some big value bets paid off. There was one recent case where I bet nearly twice the pot when a lot of draws missed on the river and got a fold (I had the nuts but didn’t show).

On to the hand in question. Villain limps UTG1 for $10, I call 7h 5h UTG3, the CO calls, the BN calls, the SB completes, and the BB checks.

Flop ($60 in pot) Qs 6d 4d. Checks to me, I bet $45, CO calls, Villain calls.

Turn ($195 in pot) 9h. Villain checks, I bet $150, CO folds, Villain calls.

River ($495 in pot) Qh. Villain checks. At least $2000 remain in the effective stacks. Hero?

What’s the best hand I should try to make him fold? How much should I bet? Do you think I’m wrong to bet at all? Leave your thoughts and comments here, and I’ll post my own thoughts as well as results some time this weekend.

Edit: Thanks to ThereYouGoAgain and others who pointed out the errors in my original post. Sorry for the confusion – Villain 1 (the open limper) did overcall the raise, and three of us saw the flop and turn (where pot size was wrong).

This hand comes from a $2/$5 no-limit hold’em game at the Venetian. Villain 1 ($700) is your typical loose-passive live player, lots of limping and calling and straight-forward play. Villain 2 ($1000) seems like a young live pro, mostly trying to make big hands and value bet weaker players, probably capable of making some plays at weaker players but also with a decided cautious/pot-control streak to him. Basically he seems uncomfortable playing marginal hands in big pots, quite possibly because he’s not adequately bankrolled for the game.

Hero is relatively new to the table but may already have established an aggressive/bluffy image. I’ve raised limpers a couple of times, three-bet others who seemed to be attacking limpers, and generally not been giving up easily post-flop. I haven’t shown down anything too crazy, but an attentive opponent would probably have noticed that I was fighting for more than my share of pots. I cover both Villains.

Villain 1 open limps in middle position, Villain 2 makes it $20 from the hijack, I call with  Jh 9h in the cutoff, Villain 1 calls and everyone else folds.

Flop ($65) Td 9c 6d. Both Villains check, I bet $45, Villain 1 snap-calls, and Villain 2 calls as well.

Turn ($200) 4s. Villain 1 bets $60, Villain 2 calls, Hero?

Post your thoughts, questions, and comments here, and I’ll be back with results and my own thoughts on Friday.

Start With Fundamentals

Verbal and other tells should generally be considered after you’ve assessed the fundamentals, which is to say how your hand compares to the rest of your range and also to your opponent’s range for getting to this point in the hand.

Let’s first recognize that Hero’s range for open raising the button is quite large. This isn’t quite a standard button open because I expected the BB to defend fairly often. I’m still going to open a lot of hands, but somewhat fewer than I would if I had no read on the BB, and when I do open, it’s for a larger amount. So conservatively, let’s give me 30% of the deck.

Obviously I’m not going to get a piece of this flop very often, so while it’s not impossible for me to have trips, a higher overpair, or even a full house, 99 is nevertheless near the top of my range simply because I am opening so many hands preflop that I will often hold no pair. Consequently, I should play 99 like a strong hand unless I have a very good reason not to.

As for Villain’s range, my read pre-flop was that he would call with a wide range. I’d expect him to 3-bet big pairs more often than not, so while it’s not impossible that he slowplayed something  preflop or called with an 8, we should expect that he probably has nothing.

“We’ll Have to See”

Now that we have a basic read on the situation, we can assess Villain’s behavior and see whether it should modify our thinking at all. It’s rare for a tell to be so severe that you do a complete 180 in how you assess a situation. More commonly, you might shift a bit one way or the other. So if you’re otherwise considering a close call, a strong tell might cause you to fold instead, or vice versa. But if you think you have an easy call, a slight show of strength probably wouldn’t be enough to change your mind.

Commenters’ opinions are divided on the meaning of Villian’s laugh and subsequent comment. Some agree with FaceyFace that, “The laugh seems like a sound of relief, indicating trips and above,” others with TedGreenberg who takes it to mean, “When 8s and 5s do show up I don’t have them”.

I’m inclined towards the latter interpretation, in part because of Zach Ellwood’s assertion that, “players who actually connect with the board will not want to draw attention to themselves. When someone suddenly stumbles across a super-strong hand, his natural, immediate instinct is to stay quiet and hide that information from others.” Moreover, since I was otherwise strongly inclined to believe I had the best hand, I’d have to be pretty damn sure in a read that Villain’s behavior meant strength before I modified my play.

Mwalsh also makes the good point that, ” if you are ever in a situation where a live player is doing something that you find it hard to interpret, I think you’re best served simply ignoring it and just crushing them in the range game that you are much better at. Since you have much more experience online, this sort of table talk guessing-game may be the only aspect of poker in which your opponents might have an edge on you.”

In short, this tell fails the threshold test. It’s not so clear an indicator of strength to shake my confidence in what is objectively a very strong hand, so I’m still approaching this situation as though I’m ahead and trying to protect/get value rather than pot control or bluff.

Value Targeting

If you’re a long-time blog reader or video watcher, then you know that the next thing I want to do is establish a value target. Value betting requires more than establishing that you figure to have the best hand. You also need to know what you’re trying to get value from.

What I believe is throwing a lot of people off here is that although Hero’s hand is very strong in terms of what’s possible on this flop, there aren’t a lot of clear second-best hands. Hero’s hand isn’t so strong relative to those that will be willing to put a lot more money into the pot.

Still, there are lower pocket pairs, the occasional 5, and flush and straight draws, all of which will surely be willing to call a bet. Moreover, Hero’s hand is quite vulnerable to an overcard, and a free card isn’t likely to create a strong second-best hand, so even without a good value target, this isn’t the time to slowplay. With a less vulnerable pair such as Kings or Aces, I’d want to check not for fear of trips but because I think, especially given his behavior, Villain probably has nothing at all and I’d want to give him a chance to bluff or make a little something.

Bet Sizing

With 9s, though, I can’t expect to beat most of the “somethings” he could make, so I ought to bet. The next question is how much.

Alan Bostick asks, “How big have your flop c-bets been in previous pots you’ve taken down?” They’ve generally been in the neighborhood of half the pot, but I don’t think it’s terribly relevant here. Even though it’s still a c-bet, this shouldn’t necessarily be treated as the same situation as any other time that I’ve bet. Both my and Villain’s position at the table and the board texture are relevant factors that should influence my bet sizing even if I were trying to play a balanced game.

The more confident I am in my read that Villain is weak, the less inclined I am even to try to play a balanced game. In position on a very dry flop against a weak range, my c-betting size is generally small, in the neighborhood of half pot or even a little less. Because I think Villain has nothing, I’m inclined to go even smaller just to induce a loose call from Ace- high or two overcards. It’s too early to say for sure, but I’d probably look to bet small again on many turns, then check back the river.

Although I don’t expect to be check-raised often, I’m still not inclined to fold immediately unless I get a physical tell of strength. My plan would be to call once and fold to further betting on almost any turn, but pocket 9s just seems too strong to give up to any reasonably sized check-raise. If I bet small, that might also help to weaken Villain check-raising range a bit by inducing either to bluff or to raise a weak made hand for protection.

Results

I bet $10, which if anything is still perhaps a little big – $8 seems better to me now – and Villain folded instantly.

Book Club

The book is just a starting point! Ed responds to listener questions and Andrew and Nate’s critiques with some of the best strategy discussion the show has seen to date. Topics include multi-way pots, re-exploiting players trying to exploit you, concealing information from tough opponents, categorizing opponents, and much more! Even if you haven’t read the book, you want to hear this in-depth strategy discussion.

Ed is @EdMillerPoker on Twitter. His self-published books, plus a lot of free strategy content, information about coaching, etc., are available from his website.

Next Month

Next month we’ll be reading Tommy Angelo’s Elements of Poker. In Episode 26, we’ll discuss Part I: Universal Elements, which runs through page 84 of the book.

Timestamps

Yesterday, though, I was on top of the waiting list for the $5/$5 game for two hours, and eventually I permitted myself to take out my phone and practice with my Spanish flashcards in between hands. I still tried to keep one eye on the action, though, and I did notice a younger guy sitting in the 5 seat who seemed a little more aggressive than average. In particular, I saw him min-raise a continuation bet on a dry flop and fold to a shove, which means he was either bluff-raising or raising for information.

About half an hour later there five limpers, and I found Qs 8s in the SB. I believed I had a solidly tight-aggressive image, so I raised it up to $25. The third limper, a particularly weak player who only began the hand with $100, called, as did the 5 seat, who had been the final limper on the CO.

The flop came 6c  3s 3c. I bet $40, the first guy folded after some putzing around, and the 5 seat quickly raised to $80. Sure that he would have raised any truly good hands rather than limp behind so many others, and doubtful as to how many 3s were in his limp-calling range, I popped it back to $120. He moved all-in very quickly.

I folded and was horrified to see an old man collecting the pot! At a ten-handed table, it can be difficult to see the player in the 5 seat from the 7 seat. Since I hadn’t made the effort to look, and had been absorbed in phone in between hands, I hadn’t noticed the kid leave the table and the old man take his place. It’s hard to bluff a player who’s no longer at the table!

Hand Reading

Thereyougoagain makes a good case for why Villain won’t see the river with many Jacks:

“as a player who rarely raises pre flop, villain has now raised under the gun..imo the only jack in his range is jj..on that flop i cant see villain leading with jj into 3 players on a flop that absolutely smashes his opponents pre flop calling range.(especially being loose passive in small pots)”

Even if we do put some other Js in his pre-flop/flop range, I’d expect a slightly larger raise on the river.

The size of his river raise is more consistent with thin value from a non-straight hand, but I agree with WPS22 that it doesn’t really make sense to check those hands on the turn and then raise them on one of the worst river cards in the deck:

“Why would villain check back 2 pair on the turn, when it’s still a relatively strong hand, then raise a bet w/ it on the river, when it’s relative strength has decreased significantly?

Not to mention that regardless of the turn action, a raise w/ 2 pair otr just makes no sense. You are folding out the vast majority of worse hands and getting called by the vast majority of better ones.”

I don’t generally expect to see river bluff-raises from this sort of player. The size of his raise seems like he expects to be called, and I just don’t see him having a lot of hands that need to bluff in his range after the pre-flop and flop action. Eric makes the best case for how Villain could possibly show up with a bluff:

“Without the waitress I think it is a fold.
With the waitress I think it is a call.
He might think you are too busy and will just fold to a raise without thinking.
Plus if you had a good hand (as good as you have or better) he might think you would be more interested in seeing what he does (and how he does it) in case you have a decision to make when he makes a possibly large raise.”

What About Raising?

The award for most thought-provoking comment of the week goes to eldodo42, who suggests,

“The only really interesting move is shoving:
1. his range practically doesn’t contain AJ (both because he checked behind OTT and because he raised too small OTR: he should expect you to call a larger raise when you have Jx)
2. your range can contain AJ (which you meant to c/r OTT and are now trying to suck some value from weak hands)
3. we know he has a fold button.
Thus, we expect him to fold Jx a non-negligible fraction of the time, and to fold anything weaker than that almost all the time (he would have weaker stuff than that since he’s aggressive in bigger pots, so he might be bluffing here).”

To be honest, this isn’t something that I considered at the time. Generally I pride myself on thinking through all of my options, even the unconventional ones, so I was chastened by his comment.

That said, I don’t think raising is good here. To be correct, it would need to be not just +EV but more +EV than calling. The fact that Villain will fold his bluffs isn’t actually an argument for shoving, since we can beat those by calling anyway. If most of the merit in shoving comes from beating bluffs, we can just call.

To make a case for shoving, then, we have to think about whether we can get Villain off of better. I’m immediately skeptical of a plan to make Villain fold the second nuts. Although Hero’s line isn’t entirely inconsistent with AJ, it’s not exactly standard either, and players with the second nuts, especially when it’s a draw that just came in, aren’t going to do mental gymnastics to find a fold.

I do think Villain would fold non-straight value hands like sets, but that’s actually the category of hands I’m most comfortable excluding from his range based on the action prior to the river. If these were a bigger chunk of his range, I could see shoving, but I just don’t think he checks the turn and raises the river with them very often at all.

Results

This is one of those WYPs where I was hoping to get some insight from you all, because I’m still not sure what the right play was based on the information I had at the time. It’s hard not to be biased once you know the results.

There was one bit of information from my first post that no one seemed to latch on to: ” we don’t have a lot of experience playing together. From what little I’ve seen he seems to be…”

My reads here were very tentative. The further you venture into exploitabile play, the more confident you need to be in the reads you’re trying to exploit. I don’t have to be good terribly often to warrant calling, and since his line didn’t make a lot of sense as a value hand either, I have to be pretty damn confident he wouldn’t bluff before I decline those odds and fold.

In the actual hand, I thought for a while and then folded. Villain showed me 97o.

We played together for several hours after that, and I never again saw anything that contradicted the reads I gave here. Sometimes people just do spazzy stuff. Should I expect it 17% of the time from this guy? I’m still not sure.

An Addendum Concerning Shoving 

Later in the night, Villain and I played a big pot where he check-raise-called about 150 BBs on the turn with 33 on a 9h 4h 3d 7d board. Granted there were a number of draws on the board, but he was still pretty unlikely to get his money in good with bottom set and that action, which makes me doubt his willingness to fold the second nuts in this hand.

Villain is a regular but for whatever reason we don’t have a lot of experience playing together. From what little I’ve seen he seems to be mostly loose-passive in small pots but capable of getting a little more tight-aggressive (as opposed to tight-passive like a lot of the middle-aged regulars) when the pot gets large. He limp-calls often but rarely raises pre-flop. The game is $5/$5 NLHE, Villain has about $700, Hero covers.

Villain opens for $20 UTG+1, MP calls $20, BTN calls $20, SB folds, Hero calls $15 more with Ks Ts.

Flop ($80 in pot) Kd Qs Th. Hero checks, Villain quickly bets $100, other two fold, Hero calls.

Turn ($280 in pot) 5h. Both check.

River ($280 in pot) 9d. Hero bets $100 without too much delay, and when Villain doesn’t act immediatley, Hero turns to transact business with a waitress. When he looks back thirty seconds later, Villain has raised to $225.

What’s your play and why?

Post your thoughts and opinions here, and I’ll be back on Friday with my own as well as the results. Fair warning: I’m on vacation this week so I may not respond to comments before Friday.

The five of us see an A82r flop. With the CO all-in, I’m last to act. They all check to me, and I bet $150, a little over a quarter of the pot. It folds back to the player on my immediate right, who calls.

We both check a blank turn, then he bets 225 on a blank river. This guy is one of the better in the game, as best I can tell a TAG with an emphasis on the tight. He’s pretty young and seems like one of those guys who wins in a loose game just by being nitty and betting hard with good hands. I fold without too much thought.

He sheepishly turns over 53s for a busted gutshot, and the all-in player smiles and coolly turns over an unimproved 74s, quintupling his stack by showing down 7-high as the winner.

Several mistakes made by several different players enabled such a strange outcome. Which was the biggest mistake and why?

Pre-Flop

A few people questioned/criticized the pre-flop call, and rightfully so. I don’t think it’s bad, but it’s literally marginal, meaning it’s a close decision that’s extremely sensitive to small changes in a number of factors. For instance, if Villain’s raise was to 60, this would be a clear call. If he raised to 90, I’d be much more likely to fold.

The value of a suited connector comes from three sources: implied odds from betting for value after making extremely strong hands, bluff equity derived from taking opponents off of better hands (which is most profitable when you have a draw as a fallback plan), and pot equity derived from showing down a marginal winner. This is true of all hands really, but what makes suited connectors both versatile and tricky is that depending on the situation, they can perform any of these functions more or less well, whereas a small pair for example will almost always rely on implied odds for the bulk of its value. Because suited connectors require so many judgment calls, it’s especially valuable to have position when playing them.

Here I believed that a combination of decent pot odds and an opponent who seemed inclined to play very straightforwardly, mitigating the value of his position, would enable me to turn a profit. I don’t think folding pre-flop would be at all bad, particularly not if you lack confidence in your post-flop and hand-reading skills.

I do think that three-betting would be a mistake, because although suited connectors can be good candidates for light three-betting, this isn’t otherwise a good spot for it. Villain seems mostly to be opening hands he’s serious about, and although he does seem to have a willingness to widen his range in late position, he may well widen his range for playing back to a three-bet appropriately as well.

Check-Raising

Swallsjr identifies the central problem with check-raising: “We called preflop. This makes it difficult to rep a range of hands which includes any set (10s,Ks,As), top two (AKs) and even top and bottom (AT).” We have reason to believe that Villain is opening a relatively strong range pre-flop, and this is a flop that connects well with that range. Because it’s so difficult for Hero to represent a nutted hand, Villain is unlikely to fold even his more marginal hits to a check-raise.

The other problem with check-raising, which Gareth points out, is that “the range of hands against which we want to get value when we hit our flush will all have the option of three-betting the flop should we raise.” No matter what Hero does, his draw will not be particularly well-concealed. The hands most likely to put in another bet from behind after a spade hits are generally strong enough to three-bet this flop, causing Hero either to fold away substantial equity in what’s getting to be a big pot or put in even more money from way behind.

Check-Calling

Calling doesn’t mean we have to give up on playing this draw aggressively. It just means we’re going to postpone that aggression unless and until a better situation arises. I think there’s reason to expect that such situations will arise with some frequency if Hero calls the flop.

The most common will be Villain checking behind the turn. I very much disagree with those who say that check-calling flop would turn Hero’s hand face-up. On the contrary, while Hero is unlikely to be nutted on this flop, he could very easily have any number of broadway hands that flopped a pair plus straight draw, bottom two pair, or top pair with a mediocre kicker. Any of these hands would check-call the flop. If Villain checks behind the turn, Hero can bet the river and expect that Villain won’t hero call third pair just because a flush draw missed. Of course Villain will sometimes check back hands like KQ or A9 that call the river, but if he checks the turn, that should shift his range into weak enough territory that a river bluff will be profitable when Hero holds 9-high. In any event those hands wouldn’t fold the flop, so this line isn’t costing Hero anything more than check-raising the flop, and I think it tells a more plausible story.

The biggest danger with this play would be if Villain barreled many of his weaker hands on the turn. This is a good board for that, but based on how he’s played so far Villain doesn’t seem likely to do it. If we believed he was, then there would be a case for check-raising the turn, but in this circumstance I would just fold to a second barrel on a blank turn unless it was very small.

The other option which several people pointed out would be to bet turn cards that complete possible straights. Unlike a flop check-raise, this line fits with many hands that could be in Hero’s range. It’s not something I would do with air, but the added equity of a flush draw should be enough to make this profitable. I think it’s important to barrel non-board-pairing non-spade rivers if you take this line, because Villain will have a lot of two-pair combos that will probably call turn and fold river.

I would also bet out on spade turns, in no small part because I don’t expect Villain to bluff or value bet them very often.

Folding

If there’s value in check-calling, then there’s no reason to fold.

Donking

Another viable option, precluded here because of the way I phrased the question, would be taking the lead away from Villain and betting this flop. Hero can represent a wider value range with this line than with a check-raise, and it denies Villain the opportunity to double-barrel bluff, which we’ve seen would be bad for a check-call strategy. I’d like that strategy best against a better player where the turn bluff was a bigger threat, but here it denies us the opportunity to get information from Villain for free simply by checking and seeing what he does, since he seems to be straight-forward.

Results

PokerStars No-Limit Hold’em, 320 Tournament, 15/30 Blinds (6 handed) – PokerStars Converter Tool from FlopTurnRiver.com

SB (t6351)
Hero (BB) (t3555)
UTG (t4362)
MP (t4782)
CO (t5125)
Button (t5922)

Hero’s M: 79.00

Preflop: Hero is BB with 8, 7
2 folds, CO bets t75, 2 folds, Hero calls t45

Flop: (t165) K, 10, A (2 players)
Hero checks, CO bets t90, Hero calls t90

Turn: (t345) Q (2 players)
Hero bets t240, CO calls t240

River: (t825) Q (2 players)
Hero bets t444, 1 fold

Total pot: t825

Results:
Hero didn’t show 8, 7 (nothing).
Outcome: Hero won t825

Thanks again to everyone who participated!

“Putting this person on a range is very difficult as a result of his unusual stats. I can’t help but think that if this person really plays 18/17 over an adequate sample size, its virtually impossible that he flat-calls a lot of suited connectors here. If he calls T9s, he also calls JTs and 78s etc, and this already makes his flatting range much wider than 1%. I find it tough to believe that he doesn’t flat anything except from the CO and Button. Accordingly, I will slightly discount the suited connector portion of his range. ”

It may be difficult, but I’d say you nailed it! And really, shouldn’t it be easier to enumerate a narrow range than a wider one? I think you’re right that a narrow calling range will consist almost exclusive of set mines. As Dana points out, his 1% cold calling range is an aggregate statistic that is almost certainly higher when he’s BTN vs UTG+1, but how wide can it be? Even {QQ-66,AQs+,KQs,QJs,JTs,T9s} is 5% of hands and probably a little too wide, so it’s tough to put many non-pairs into his range.

For those of you who can’t or won’t read the article, the short version is that I advocate check-calling all the way because it’s extremely difficult for Villain to have a draw. It’s rarely correct to slowplay on a board this wet or to focus on inducing bluffs with a hand this strong, but in this case so much of Villain’s range is so weak that I think it’s correct just to try to induce bluffs or ideally get him to hit a lower set.

Jonny argues that, “If he expects us to check AA or KK on this board then he is presumably less likely to bluff. ” He’s less likely to one-barrel, that’s for sure. Particularly if the board gets scary, it would be very reasonable for him to think that AA/KK will fold by the river. Meanwhile that first barrel can get me to fold the bottom of my range, like AK, Ad Jd, and small pairs that I’m just check-giving up on this flop but that have good equity against Villain’s small pair.

As Prabhat and others point out, checking probably results in us stacking 88 less often. For the same reasons, though, we probably get stacked less often by QQ and T9. Granted 88 should be a larger part of his range, since we’re not certain he shows up with QQ or T9 at all, but on balance we’re actually not a huge favorite if Villain is willing to get all-in on the flop. Even being generous about the number of combo draws he could have:

Board: 8c Qs Jc
Dead:

equity     win     tie           pots won     pots tied
Hand 0:     52.599%      52.05%     00.55%               7729            82.00   { JdJs }
Hand 1:     47.401%      46.85%     00.55%               6957            82.00   { QQ, 88, AcKc, AcQc, AcTc, KcQc, QJs, T9s }

A lot hinges on whether he can have T9 or QQ, since subtracting T9 bumps us to 60% equity, and subtracting both gets us to 80%. Then again, if has neither, he probably doesn’t have those other suited connectors much either, meaning that we rarely get action at all when we bet. I think we make nickels on the dollar getting all-in on the flop, whereas we have near 100% equity against underpairs, so inducing them to bluff should be the higher priority.

Indeed, as Shawn says, a bet on this board will look very strong: “I think another thing to consider is our perceived hand range also to Villain. If we bet the flop I think he can take out AA, KK, TT, 99, AQ, KQ as we don’t really want to build a huge pot OOP against such a wet board with one pair/gutter hands. If we’re UTG+1 raising pre and betting the flop into such a wet board vs a button caller I think that narrows are range down to nut flushes with overs and sets although maybe not 88.”

This is an instance where Villain probably doesn’t even realize how much information we have about his hand. Rather than bet and give away so much information about our own, I think it’s better to exploit the leg-up we currently enjoy by giving some Villain some rope to represent hands he’ll rarely if ever have.

I know I described Villain as “not very tricky or creative,” but I don’t think that precludes him from taking a few stabs at what looks like a very weak line. I do think it makes him less likely to float or bluff-raise the flop, so in this case checking seems like the best way to induce bluffs from his very weak range:

PokerStars No-Limit Hold’em, $4.00 BB (9 handed) – PokerStars Converter Tool from FlopTurnRiver.com

CO ($685.70)
Button ($449)
SB ($402)
BB ($527)
UTG ($400)
Hero (UTG+1) ($434.35)
MP1 ($400)
MP2 ($412)
MP3 ($206.95)

Preflop: Hero is UTG+1 with J, J
1 fold, Hero bets $16, 4 folds, Button calls $16, 2 folds

Flop: ($38) 8, Q, J (2 players)
Hero checks, Button bets $25.25, Hero calls $25.25

Turn: ($88.50) 6 (2 players)
Hero checks, Button bets $59.85, Hero calls $59.85

River: ($208.20) A (2 players)
Hero checks, Button checks

Total pot: $208.20 | Rake: $3

Results:
Button mucked 4, 4 (one pair, fours).
Hero had J, J (three of a kind, Jacks).
Outcome: Hero won $205.20

Edit: Whoops, didn’t mean to publish this yet, but I guess the cat’s out of the bag now. The 2+2 Magazine article should be up later today, I’ll add a link when it’s live.

Edit 2: Link is now live.

PokerStars No-Limit Hold’em, $4.00 BB (9 handed) – PokerStars Converter Tool from FlopTurnRiver.com

CO ($685.70)
Button ($449)
SB ($402)
BB ($527)
UTG ($400)
Hero (UTG+1) ($434.35)
MP1 ($400)
MP2 ($412)
MP3 ($206.95)

Preflop: Hero is UTG+1 with J, J
1 fold, Hero bets $16, 4 folds, Button calls $16, 2 folds

Flop: ($38) 8, Q, J (2 players)

Please leave a comment with both what you want to do on the flop and your general plan from there. How will you proceed on club turns/rivers, straightening cards, and blanks (for those who have trouble with the suits, it’s 8c Qs Jc and Hero has Js Jd)? I’ll post results and my thoughts on Thursday.

Hero has four real options here, all of which were thoroughly analyzed in the comments: check-raise all-in, bet small to induce a raise, bet 75-125% of pot, or open shove for 200% of pot. I’ll offer my thoughts on each here, but I strongly encourage you to go back and skim the comments if you haven’t, because there’s a lot of good material in there that I’m not going to address specifically.

Bet 75-125% of Pot– As a theoretical matter, I believe that when you have the nuts you should generally take a line that maximizes your chances of playing a large pot, even if this results in winning less from the bottom of your opponent’s range. It’s a fundamental principle of poker: big hand, big pot. For that reason, I don’t like this line. This is a much better card for Hero’s range than for Villain’s and not one on which he’s likely to bluff or bluff-catch aggressively. Even very strong hands like sets may just call a bet of this size, which is of course a disaster for us, so this is my least favorite option.

Shove- This line has similar problems to the one above. Villain probably won’t fold sets because people suck at folding sets, but I would expect him to fold anything less. As commenter Jonny put it, “The problem with overbetting is that it’s the one move that’s most likely to get Villain thinking carefully about how strong Hero really should be if he bets this river at all.” It is the best way to get value from sets, so it has that going for it, but I think there are other ways to stack sets while still extracting good value from slightly less strong hands.

Check-Raise All In- Commenters argued for this line for two reasons: to induce bluffs and to make Villain feel pot-stuck with his strong hands. I’m inclined to agree with Bond2King when he says, “Hero’s range here includes every possible strong hand, and it’s basically impossible for Villain to not have showdown value. That combined with the fact that Villain is on the tight side and the stakes are $1/$2 makes me think that it’s very possible that he’s simply never bluffing the river here no matter what we do.” Or as Andy more poetically put it, “We have his range aggressively sliced from bottom”. Villain has called two sizeable bets on a relatively dry board, and has a tight range as early as pre-flop, so there just aren’t many hands for him to bluff with.

Because Villain has so few bluffs in his range, there isn’t much reason why I would check-call this flop. Thus, as $trate argues, “Villian should only bet river for value if he plans to call it off, because all hands eexcept for T9s are bluffcatchers, and hero basically has no hand to c/c.” I don’t necessarily expect even an above average $1/$2 player to realize this, but it’s not at all impossible that Villain checks back hands as good as AQ- I believe that would be the correct play for him.

Finally, I’m concerned about whether Villain will call a check-raise with any but his absolute strongest hands. Such a move would look awfully strong and turn even his small sets into bluff-catchers in a spot where Hero is extremely unlikely to be bluffing. I wouldn’t be shocked if he talked himself into a call, but again I think the correct play for him with 44 facing a check-raise is to fold, and I wouldn’t be shocked if he did that either.

Bet Smallish to Induce- Several of the people advocating this line were talking about inducing bluffs, which I’ve already said I don’t consider likely. However, I think a smallish bet makes Hero’s hand look weak enough that Villain will seriously consider shoving any hand that would have called an open shove or a check-shove. Thus, this line stands to extract a modest bet from the middle of Villain’s range and quite possibly a stack from the top of it.

Since Hero can’t make his hand look like a bluff (this board is simply too goo for his range), the next best thing is to make it look like a weak value bet. As Jonny says, “he can hope to get looked up by 2 pair hands if he himself shoves his sets over a smallish bet. ” Georgios also put it very well when he wrote,

“I think villain (tight side TAG) he must respect your raise UTG. So after both calls in a dry flop and similar (dry) turn, on the river he has something strong [AQ,2pairs,set,str8(less likely)] or with showdown value [KQ,QT,TT,AK,AT (less likely)]. It is almost impossible to have bluffing range at river,and the A on the river is either a good bluffing hand for you(not reason to bluff for him) or good for UTG raise range and difficult to turn his showdown hands to bluff you out…

In case he is strong you’ ll go all in even you bet or check..

In case he has showdown hands I think he check after your check but may be he call a modest bet about 60% of the pot.. if you bet about 50 he have to call 50 to win 134 so he must be right about one time in three.. If he think you are vg and agrres player you have that bluffing percentage with good bluffing card as A.”

So that’s what I’d advocate, and what I did:

PokerStars No-Limit Hold’em, $2.00 BB (6 handed) – PokerStars Converter Tool from FlopTurnRiver.com

BB ($266.50)
Hero (UTG) ($206.40)
MP ($80)
CO ($200)
Button ($482.95)
SB ($261.25)

Preflop: Hero is UTG with 10, K
Hero bets $6, 1 fold, CO calls $6, 3 folds

Flop: ($15) Q, 8, 4 (2 players)
Hero bets $9.65, CO calls $9.65

Turn: ($34.30) J (2 players)
Hero bets $24.45, CO calls $24.45

River: ($83.20) A (2 players)
Hero bets $48, CO raises to $159.90 (All-In), Hero calls $111.90

Total pot: $403 | Rake: $3

Results:
Hero had 10, K (straight, Ace high).
CO had J, J (three of a kind, Jacks).
Outcome: Hero won $400

To be fair, these results don’t tell us much, since any line except potting it is likely to get a stack from this hand. Still, I think this roughly half-pot bet is the way to go.

Thanks again to everyone who participated, this was easily the best discussion we’ve had!

There was one detail I changed from the actual hand, and that had to do with the profile of Villain 2. He was actually not quite as good as I made him out to be in my post, which I think makes the hand a lot closer. I ended up cold calling his flop raise. Villain 1 folded, but Villain 2 quickly shoved a 2h turn, and I folded. I’d be more comfortable making this fold against a better hand reader, but I still don’t regret it.

Only a few people suggested exactly this line, but a lot of the commenters picked up on several of the crucial facets of this hand, most importantly that continuing to put money into the pot after V2’s raise is going to look extremely strong.

Those who didn’t pick up on this generally seemed to read too much into my description of V1 as “slightly more LAG”. This is a dangerous mistake, because many players rely on small displays of loose-aggressive behavior causing opponents to assume their ranges are much wider than they actually are in large pots.

The lack of draws on this flop should actually constrain everyone’s aggressive ranges. In other words, there are no high-equity draws to fastplay or to protect against, so people have less reason to raise medium-strength hands like AK. V2 probably 3-bets this hand pre-flop more often than not, but if he did happen to flat call it, I wouldn’t expect him to raise it on the flop. Why would he? There are very few worse hands that can call, and no hand can have more than five outs against him (those five-out hands being QJ type stuff that V1 may not be betting in the first place). I figured A7 to be the bottom of his value range, and I didn’t expect him to have much of a bluffing range.

To the extent that he has a bluffing range, it probably consists of gutshots, as many of you argued. Those hands have four outs against AJ, so the need to protect against those draws is not great. The risk of letting them draw to four outs is in my opinion outweighed by the risk of getting the rest of my stack in when I am myself drawing to four or fewer outs. As Ian Ripley put it,

“As played, anything we do (bar folding) is going to look hella scary to both villains, I think. If we ship, I expect villains to be able to ditch A7, to the extent that it’s in either of their preflop ranges (note there’s only one A7s combo left). The range that crushes us is tiny, but 1) it’s squared since there are two villains in the hand and 2) the chance that either villain puts much more money in with worse seems slender. I don’t think a fold is out of the question.

We’re risking 110k in our stack to win 50k+ in the pot, so it’s possible that we are +EV shipping even expecting villains to play perfectly.

*dodgy maths alert*
We need to take it down roughly 2/3 of the time, so we need both villains to fold roughly sqrt(2)/sqrt(3) of the time, or 81%. 5 combos of hands that crush us means that each villain needs some 20+ hands that fold to get us to breakeven. Meh, I’m not liking the look of it at all.”

Whether raising or calling, Hero will look extremely strong if he puts any money into the pot with two players left to act behind him who have already shown interest in the flop. I think A7 is very foldable for either Villain, which means that if any more money goes into the pot, Hero is crushes. The goal, then, must be to put no more money into the pot.

That said, I do think both Villain’s ranges are wide enough that Hero can call the flop raise. I just don’t think he can expect any more money to go into the pot profitably. Thankfully, the lack of draws on the board makes cold calling a viable option. The risk of letting V2 draw for free is low.

The other danger that some commenters identified was the possibility of inducing a bluff. This is really something I’m not the least bit worried about. Even if cold calling turned Hero’s hand face-up as AJ, which I don’t think it does, I doubt either Villain would expect to push someone off of that hand. Also the call could easily be 77 or JJ (I would not have 3-bet JJ pre-flop and I don’t think either Villian would expect me to do so 100%).

The thing that most worried me about folding the turn is that V2 may well shove AJ. This is the part where I thought a better TAG might differ from the real life V2 and the reason I changed that detail when posting the hand. Of course with AJ I only chop the pot where I lost it almost always against 77. Against a range of {JJ,77,AJs,AJo}, I have less than 33% equity whereas I need more like 35-40% to call it off given the size of his bet and the value of my survival in the tournament. So it’s close, but I feel I’ve shown enough strength on the flop to fold the turn.

You’re never going to be exploited folding the bottom of my range, and once I cold call the flop, that’s what AJ is. Thanks to everyone who participated!

Edit: Fixed on mistake regarding number of sets possible and fixed typo that left out my equity vs. Villain’s shoving range.

Loose-aggressive play has become so common among the best players that many of them tend to assume that anyone who doesn’t open 50% of hands from the CO can’t be all that good. No American in the tournament is going to be bad, since we all had to travel quite a ways to play, but I think that playing the way I did gave the impression that I was merely competent and perhaps uncomfortable in deep-stacked spots. That’s a fine image to have as long as you know how to exploit it by stealing in spots they don’t expect.

As always, please let me know what you think!

Hero starts the hand with 115K, Villain 2 has 105K, Villain 1 has 150K. Average is about 90K.

Blinds are 1000/2000/200. Villain 1 raises to 5100 UTG, Villain 2 calls in the CO, and Hero overcalls Ah Jd on the Button. Flop is Ac Jh 7s. Villain 1 bets 12K, Villain 2 raises to 25K, what’s your play with top two? Obviously a lot could happen here but please do your best to describe your plan for likely future scenarios depending on what you want to do on the flop.

I’ll leave this open for the week and post results and my thoughts on Friday.

It is, however, a skill I’d like to have. I generally tell my students that you need to know their goals in poker before you can decide their playing style. If you are planning on being in the game for a long time to come, then you should focus on getting better rather than maximizing your current hourly rate. That generally means playing fewer tables and thinking through each hand that you play very thoroughly. When you are trying to maximize your short-term income, then it makes sense to focus on playing as many tables as possible, even if you are playing slightly less well and not actively improving.

I’m not in the short-term camp myself, but at the same time I need to pick up the pace at which I’m earning VPP’s if I’m going to take full advantage of my PokerStars Team Online deal. I’ve also decided that, since most my individual coaching students play 100NL or 200NL, it wouldn’t hurt me to get some more experience in those games. So, last night, I sat down at 13 6-handed tables of 1/2 NLHE, and played for 3 hours with no breaks. I know some people play considerably more than, but for me that’s a lot.

Couple observations from that first experience:

1. It takes practice and some warming-up. This is part of why I was reluctant to take breaks. For the first half hour so I was just frantic, barely thinking about what I was doing, timing out, etc. By the time I hit the two-hour mark, I felt like I had it under control, though I wasn’t eager to add more tables, either. I can see myself getting better over time, though.

2. It’s tiring. I was really exhausted at the end of the session, much more so than I usually am after playing for three hours.

3. It feels like work. I go back and forth in terms of how much poker feels like working vs. playing a game, but this felt almost entirely like work. I was checking the clock every 2-3 minutes as I neared the 3-hour mark.

4. You feel every table. When a game broke and I was temporarily playing just 12 tables, there was a noticeable difference in how harried I felt and how much time I could allot to each table.

5. Screen size matters. I’m probably a fish for tiling my tables instead of cascading, but I definitely lost some time squinting at small tables to make out stack or bet sizes. I’ll have to try cascading.

6. Table Ninja is huge. I couldn’t have done this without my hotkeys.

7. My play suffers noticeably. I’m definitely not ready to try this at 2/4. In particular, I was relying overly much on the bet sizes I have programmed into my Table Ninja rather than sizing them situationally.

8. There’s a strong incentive to play TAG, though not necessarily ABC. I found myself folding a lot of hands that would have been marginal opens just because I was too busy on other tables and didn’t want to deal with them. I was also far more likely to 3-bet/fold vs. a raise than flat call, since I wasn’t confident that I’d have the attention to invest in playing post-flop without the initiative. I still made moves, but they were more often bluff-raising and barreling rather than floating or checking to represent something tricky.

My goal, which I may or may not follow through on depending on how much I improve in future sessions, is to play 50K hands of 1/2 NLHE 6-max this month. That’s a lot for me, especially since it’s not the only thing I intend to play, but it’s very feasible. And besides, it’s about time I got my grind on.

Early in their no-limit hold ’em careers, many players are overly concerned with protecting their hands. Novice players with top pair commonly obsess over the possibility of a flush draw and often become so single-minded about “charging the draw” that they fail to get value from second-best hands and/or to protect the remainder of their stacks from sets and the like.

After making this mistake for a while, players eventually learn their lesson. Many overcorrect and adopt a new mantra: only bet if you can get a call from a worse hand or a fold from a better one. In other words, many players learn to bet only as either a value bet or as a bluff, leaving behind the concept of protection that cost them so many buy-ins when misapplied.

Yet this too is a mistake. Weak players often misapply the concept with expensive consequences, but that does not make the concept itself invalid.

Please let me know what you think!

The ability to size your bet based on the situation and what you hope to accomplish with the bet is one of the primary factors that distinguishes no-limit from fixed-limit hold ’em. Deliberately forfeiting this option is bringing a knife to a gunfight.

Every bet or raise should have a purpose. You can and should tailor the size of the bet to suit that purpose. When done correctly, you can even balance your ranges for various sizes so that your bet sizing is not exploitable.

Check it out and please let me know what you think!

PokerStars No-Limit Hold’em, $10.00 BB (6 handed) – Poker-Stars Converter Tool from FlopTurnRiver.com

Hero (SB) ($2982)
BB ($970)
UTG ($969.50)
MP ($200)
CO ($275)
Button ($3271.65)

Preflop: Hero is SB with A, 9
1 fold, MP bets $20, 1 fold, Button calls $20, Hero raises to $90, 2 folds, Button calls $70

Flop: ($210) 3, 9, A (2 players)
Hero bets $177, Button calls $177

Turn: ($564) 8 (2 players)
Hero bets $388, Button raises to $880, Hero calls $492

River: ($2324) K (2 players)
Hero checks, Button bets $2124.65 (All-In), Hero folds

Total pot: $2324 | Rake: $3

Results:
Button shows 4, 4 (one pair, fours).
Outcome: Button won $2321

I told him in chat that 4’s were the best hand, but really even Kdx beats 44 by the river, so I doubt he believed me.

It’s pretty unlikely that I’ll have a flush by the river, but against a nit I don’t really consider calling with less. That’s the problem with exploitive play: it is itself exploitable.

For me my biggest problem was that I was always playing 9-12 tables. Because of this, I was making a lot of money but never really working on my game and improving. I think this is a problem that many mid stakes players struggle with as to improve and move up they most likely will need to sacrifice a little bit in the short run in order to progress as a player. I also found that playing heads up greatly improved my hand reading skills along with improving my game in blind battles and when playing OOP. Most of my success at the 5/10 – 25/50 level has come when I was playing 1-5 tables and truly concentrating on every hand instead of just going through the motions.

I often encourage students who come to me for 6-max or full ring coaching to try playing some Heads Up, particularly if they struggle with hand reading and thinking outside of the box.

This bit of advice, on the other hand, is either dated or just plain impractical:

I think when playing HU game selection is so key. Early on when I was putting up a huge winrate at HU I game selected religiously and for the most part just destroyed fish. Once you get into playing other good regulars you’re just looking at a variance nightmare which can often take tens of thousands of hands to iron out. I’d say for the most part just try to concentrate on playing fish or exploitable weaker regulars and you can maintain an extremely high winrate with relatively little variance but if you decide to play other good players expect 20-30 buy-in downswings semi regularly and a much lower winrate

Yes, it would be nice to play heads up all day long with fish at 5/10, but they just aren’t that easy to find. If you aren’t willing to play some decent regulars, it’s hard to find any action at all.

Overall a pretty good and interesting interview, though!