This month I’ve got two publications to report. First, my latest article for 2+2 Magazine, titled Float On, is now appearing in the March issue. It’s an analysis of when, whom, and how to bluff-call, including an in-depth example:
Suppose that when your opponent bets, you think there is a 30% chance that he has a hand strong enough to continue and a 70% chance that his hand is too weak to stand a raise. If you raise his bet, you will win the pot 70% of the time and lose the amount of your bluff 30% of the time. As long as you choose an appropriate raise size, that’s a very profitable proposition for you.If your opponent will play predictably on the turn, though, and many will, then it may be even more profitable just to call his bet and see what he does on the turn. The 70% of the time that he does not have anything, he will check, and you can now wager the same amount that you would have with a raise, or maybe even a little less, but steal the pot 100% of the time. The 30% of the time that he does have a hand, he’ll bet again and you can fold, saving yourself the amount that a bluff-raise would have cost you.
I’m also featured in Kristy Arnett’s new Run It Twice series on Cardplayer:
People want to be able to play a lot of hands from late position, which makes sense because that’s where you make most of your money. If you are getting three-bet a whole lot from the blinds, you have to fold some of the weaker hands that you are raising with, so some people have started making these small raises so that they can call more three-bets preflop and also lose less money if they fold when they get three-bet. It’s an adaptation some people have made to enable themselves to play more hands from late position.
Liked the floating article. One note about OOP floating though…it seems from you’re article like you’re thinking of check/calling the flop and then leading the turn. But another potential line is to check/call the flop and then lead the river, like say on an AT385 board or something like that. Not a bad line to take with any two broadways there, or 34 or 25 or something (putting aside the question of how you got to the flop with something so close to the nut low). At least for me, when I see a check/call on a dry flop like that, I’m thinking that my opponent has a weak ace or maybe a T, and in general I’m not going to try to get them off it. Leading the river opens you up to getting raised by a worse hand since you’re representing a bet for thin value, like you have A6 or something and want to get called by QQ. Phil Ivey takes this line with total air in heads-up games quite a bit, I’ve noticed. But he is a sick sick man.
Nice interview too. Spades are always gold. What do you mean by your comment beginning “from a game theory perspective” in the last graph? If he knows the range you are 3-betting with there, he can react optimally to it. In particular, if his KQ or whatever is ahead of your range, he can take this thin value line to get even more thin value by also inducing a 3-bet bluff from you. What’s the worst hand you’d re-raise for value? 76s?
-bruechips
Brue,
In the article, I did acknowledge the possibility of leading the river. I said something like “you either take an implausible line or you risk giving a free card/showdown”. I’ve been using the OOP float somewhat more often myself lately, but it is a much riskier play for the reasons I gave.
What I meant is that a bluff like this makes it harder for him to value raise even if he doesn’t see the hand. A lot of people tend to think that mixing up your game/range is only effective if your opponent actually sees the deceptive hand at showdown. But the truth is that a bluff like this makes his thin value raises less profitable even if he doesn’t know I’m capable of it.