Gloria Jackson

The other fun thing about my starting table was that Ian Simpson was there. If you don’t know Ian, you will soon. We’ve already recorded an interview with him and will publish it perhaps as early as this coming Monday, if it doesn’t get pre-empted by WSOP content (will depend on how much time we find to record in the next few days).

Nate and I had high hopes of getting dinner with Ian and Ryan Hall, but it turned out that the break was only 30 minutes, which caused Ryan to drop out, and Ian had already busted and left, so it was just Nate and me. And in fact, if Nate hadn’t busted shortly before dinner break and volunteered to get a table and place an order in advance, we wouldn’t even have managed that. I really don’t understand the point of a 30 minute dinner break.

Overall I think I played perhaps the best tournament poker I have yet in this event. I got moved away from my awesome starting table and spent the rest of the day tangling (or trying not to tangle) with some tough young Europeans. Unfortunately I just kept losing pre-flop all ins after chipping up.

There was one other hand I was proud of. At 400/800/100, I opened to 2000 with Jc 9c in the CO, and the BB, one of aforementioned Europeans, re-raised to 6000. There are some people who will be quite strong when they three-bet from the big blind, preferring to call most hands that they might use as “light” three-bets, and although I did expect this player to be polarized, I would expect him to have a more good/balanced three-betting strategy even from the big blind. So, I called with about 31K behind.

The flop came Qc 9hs 8c, and he bet 6K. I think a lot of people will just jam here because they know they have a lot of equity and they aren’t comfortable playing future streets. With a slightly weaker hand, say Kc Tc, I think shoving is correct – you’d rather get all in on the flop, ideally with some fold equity, than call and get forced off your equity on a blank turn.

However, I think my hand is strong enough to get all in no matter the turn card, and I don’t think Villain will fold many hands with substantial equity. It’s important to consider all of your options rather than just defaulting to a shove any time you have enough equity to get all in, and here I think there’s more value in calling than shoving.

The turn was a Q, and we both checked. The river was the 3s, we both checked again, and he showed Aces to win the pot. To be clear, although this was a nice side benefit of just calling the flop, avoiding a stack off to overpairs on a few specific runouts is really not the main reason to call the flop. I’m going to be stacking off on most turns, this was just the rare card that neither of us particularly wanted to bet, and that happened to work to my advantage.

I had a weirder spot with the most obviously recreational player at the table, an older woman who was quite friendly and whom I’m sure I’ve seen around before and perhaps even played with. She opened from middle position to 1700 (BB was still 800), and I called with 52s in my BB.

The flop came 877r, and we both checked.

The turn was a 2, I bet 3000, and she called.

The river was a 3, and I was a bit unsure how to proceed. I expected to have the best hand quite often, as I think she’d bet pairs on the flop almost always. Was she really going to call me down twice with Ace-high though? On this board, it seemed plausible. I’ve actually coached a few people who are roughly in her demographic and quite aware of their image and accustomed to people who look like me firing spewy bluffs at people who look like them. So, I bet 6000, and she called with K7s for trips, which it actually surprised me a bit that she would have that based on her pre-flop position (not that she couldn’t have other 7x) and doesn’t really tell me anything one way or the other about the river bet.

A few orbits later, with the BB at 1000, she opened my big blind again, to 2200. This time, I held 22. I decided to jam for my last 18K, based on the fact that she’d showed down the K7s and also A6o from a similar position. I also thought that she might fold a bit too much, perhaps something as strong as AJo. Frankly, though, this is probably a little spewy, and if we’re being honest, I caught a whiff of strength when she looked at her cards.

Sure enough, she called with 88 to bust me. The only consolation was that even if I had called with the 22, I would have flopped a set and lost to a turned 8, so in this case the mistake didn’t actually cost me anything, but it was a mistake nonetheless.

Nate and I are going to play the Team Event at the WSOP today, which should be fun.

In today’s post I want to bridge the gap between these issues that are of obvious interest to poker players and other political topics that may not seem directly poker-related but that still have some tangential relationship to poker players and the decisions that we make about where to play. These are topics about which poker players are likely to have divergent opinions, but I think that they merit more discussion than they get in the poker world, both over the table and elsewhere.

The opposing argument here is the “I come to the poker room to play poker, I don’t want to hear anyone talk about politics” attitude. Your decision to play poker at a particular venue is political, it has political consequences, and I see no reason why these consequences shouldn’t be legitimate topics of conversation. Choosing to ignore or refuse to discuss these consequences doesn’t make you apolitical, it just makes you ignorant.

The following is something like a case study. It’s an example of how poker players can’t just avoid politics, though we can and too often do ignore them. My stance on this specific subject is not a strong one, and I have myself played at these poker rooms before, though it always made me uncomfortable and I’d prefer to avoid playing at them again. I use it rather as an example of an issue that I think some but not all poker players would care about if they were forced to think about it. My point, overall, is that discussion in the poker world ought be more, not less, overtly political than it currently is, and the following is a small contribution thereto.

Playing Poker at Dog and Horse Tracks Subsidizes the Racing Industry

Many poker rooms in the US are at dog- or horse-racing facilities. Often, when seeking legislative authorization to introduce poker and/or casino gambling on their premises, the owners of these facilities explicitly argued that the racetrack alone was no longer economically viable and that other forms of gambling were needed essentially to subsidize the industry. Playing poker and otherwise spending money at these facilities is very directly supporting the racing industry, even if you don’t actually place any racing bets. The Florida Times-Union reports that,

The “decoupling” movement has created an odd alliance between racetrack casino operators, who see the races as a burden, and animal rights groups out to end greyhound racing altogether, much as they succeeded in outlawing cockfighting several years ago.

“When decoupling passes, it will lead to a slow and gradual end” of the industry, said Carey Theil, executive director of the anti-racing group Grey2K USA.

Dog racing’s troubles also could be a preview of things to come for the horse racing industry, which in some states has identical laws tying it to casino gambling. Money bet at thoroughbred tracks dropped from just over $15 billion in 2003 to less than $11 billion in 2013, according to the Jockey Club, an industry clearinghouse.

Though stronger financially than dog racing, horse racing is also far more expensive to stage, and only a handful of the biggest tracks are profitable without casinos to support them.

Some within the horse racing industry see decoupling laws as a threat to their own sport.

“They could set a dangerous precedent for all breeds of racing,” said Lonny Powell, the CEO of the Florida Thoroughbred Breeders and Owners Association, who worked for years as a regulator of dog races.

In Florida, casino owners and animal welfare advocates have actually gotten together to support a bill that would decouple casinos from race tracks, a move that would likely be the death knell for the racing industry in that state. This should give you an idea of the importance of casino patrons to the continued viability of the race track at venues where the two are coupled.

Animal Lovers Should Have a Problem With That

I realize that some people just don’t value animal welfare very highly, and I’m not going to argue that point right now. Judging by the number of “look at my adorable dog” posts I see on my Twitter timeline, I suspect that many poker players do not want to subsidize animal cruelty and have just never really thought about or been pressed on the topic. According to advocacy group Grey2KUSA,

“To racetrack promoters, dogs are short-term investments. Even the fastest dogs only race for a few years, and are expected to generate enough profit during that time to make up for their total costs. The pressure to generate profits can lead to negligent care. Adoption groups often receive dogs in a general state of neglect, including dogs suffering from severe infestations of fleas, ticks, and internal parasites. To cut costs, dogs are fed raw 4-D meat from dying, diseased, disabled and dead livestock. This meat is deemed unfit for human consumption. The quality of veterinary care a dog receives can also be compromised by financial considerations.”

Meanwhile, the New York Times reports that,

horse racing continues to wrestle publicly with a drug culture that its officials concede has badly damaged the sport. A New York Times investigation in 2012 showed how a pervasive drug culture, encouraged by trainers and aided by veterinarians, put horses and riders at risk. The Times found that 24 horses a week died at American tracks, a rate greater than in countries where drug use was severely restricted.

These are at the very least problematic industries, and as far as I know there’s been virtually no discussion among poker players about boycotting events at these facilities, although in my opinion there’s more of a case for that than for boycotting the Venetian and other Adelson properties.

Not Talking About Politics is Political

This is a political issue of the sort that could prompt someone to say, “Shut up with your bleeding heart politics and just play poker.” Then again, bringing the issue up at a poker table could easily bring the issue to the attention of someone who does care about it and who will change his behavior accordingly. Thus, the call not to talk about politics is also a call to keep this person in the dark, which of course serves the interests of the racing industry, which would rather not have people talking about issues such as doping or the disturbingly high death rate of their animals.

I’ve gone into detail on this one, but there are similar issues related to many poker venues. Animal lovers might also think about the treatment of captive marine mammals before playing the PCA at Atlantis. Indian casinos have their own set of complications, as I’m sure do most casinos.

It’s easy to shrug and say, “I’m just here to play poker, none of that is my concern.” But should we? And more to point, should we chastise those who do not?

Villain’s Range

Ian encapsulates my thoughts on the flop: “Neither villain’s actions on the flop are particularly scary – the donk is usually weak in my experience, and the raise can therefore be quite weak, too – unpaired overs, an overpair possibly too, I suppose a 9. On the other hand, your overcall is really quite scary.” At every point where Villain has put money into the pot, he’s had a decent expectation of fold equity. I don’t have enough experience with him to say exactly how wide his range will be in a spot like this, and of course he could play strong hands like overpairs or even quads this way, but he could easily be wider than that.

This is the impetus for my wanting to play back at him in the first place. I have the rare hand that actually has some equity against the top of his range plus good reason to believe his range is wider than it “should” be.

Target

This raises the question of just ambitious we should be with our bluffing. The choice is whether to go after hands as strong as AA or simply to try to make him fold the portion of his range with which he himself was bluffing.

The latter can be done cheaply and is in my opinion not optional. Any player with half a clue is not going to expect you to be light here, and if he himself has nothing, you can expect him to give up easily. A bet of $150 – $200 offers you great odds and should drive him off the non-pair portion of his range.

The bigger question is whether to try to run Villain off of stronger hands. This is a more opponent-dependent decision, as some players simply aren’t going to fold big pairs no matter how plausibly you represent a narrow range.

Against the right player, though, you really can represent that narrow range here. There aren’t many hands that are going to cold-call a raise on this flop, and a big bet on either the turn or river should polarize you to the point where a good hand reader won’t expect you to bet worse than KK for value. At that point, he just has to decide whether you have quads or some sort of airball with which you called his flop raise. Many players won’t even call the flop raise with a straight draw, so it’s really very difficult to put Hero on a bluff here, with 66 being the most likely candidate.

Given the stacks, I think bombing the turn in order to set up a river shove is the best way to do this. Even if you don’t actually shove the river, you get the most leverage by sizing your turn bet in a way that suggests it’s coming. This should generate more fold equity per dollar than checking back and betting the river, even if you were to overbet shove the river. It’s also most consistent with how Villain probably expects you to play quads.

Balance

If you believe you know whether and when Villain will fold AA (or whatever you think the top of his folding range will be), then you can exploit that by taking the appropriate line. If you don’t know, then the best thing you can try to do is use the few bluffing hands in your range to balance the few combos of quads in your range.

We can reasonably suppose that the only hand with which you will pot the turn and shove the river for value is quads. This is an unbalanced range, since Villain could exploit it by folding all of his bluff-catchers when you pot the turn. Similarly, if you have bluffs in your range when you pot the turn but never when you shove the river, then Villain could exploit that by calling the turn with his bluff-catchers and folding if you shove the river.

Thus, you need to have some bluffs inyour range for both of these plays if you don’t know how Villain will respond to these bets with his bluff-catchers. Specifically, you need to bluff in proportion to the pot odds that your bet offers on each street.

Working this out over multiple streets is complicated, and David Sklansky’s article on the subject has been a great help to me. With a stack-to-pot ratio of roughly 4, there is room for a pot-sized bet on the turn followed by a pot-sized shove on the river.

The point I’m still mulling over is how the presence of the nuts in Villain’s range changes Hero’s optimal frequency, since Sklansky’s example assumes that Villain has a clearly-defined bluff-catcher (or “mediocre hand”, to use his terminology). I’m going to keep working on it myself, but any insight that you all may have would be appreciated. As I said, I’ll post an update when I think I have it figured out.

Results

The basic thrust of Sklansky’s article, and the fundamental value of leverage, is that a big turn bet puts tremendous pressure on Villains bluff-catching range. My plan, then, was to bet big on the turn and then give up on the river. This line could be exploited by a Villain who’s willing to call the turn with a lot of bluff-catchers, so I was gambling that my opponent was not that player. I bet $600, and he folded.

I don’t have any reads on Villains other than their general appearances and demeanors. Villain 1 looks and acts like a recreational player, and this isn’t the first time he’s limped. He’s playing about $1000. Villain 2 looks and acts like a pro, but I don’t know whether he’s strictly a live pro or if he used to play online. He’s about 24 years old and has roughly $3000 in front of him.

Villain 1 open limps in middle position, Villain 2 makes it $40 two off the button, I call with 8s 7s on the button, the BB calls, and Villain 1 calls.

Flop ($165) 9s 9c 6d. BB checks, Villain 1 quickly bets $70, Villain 2 quickly raises to $230, I think for a bit and call. BB and Villain 1 both fold without further thought.

My thinking on the call is that I have the nut bluffing hand and neither player is particularly likely to have a 9, both because of combinatorics and based on their actions and timing. Given how deep I am with Villain 2, a call here should make it uncomfortable for him to continue even with something as strong as Aces.

The biggest question for me on the flop is whether to call or raise. I thought a call might actually look stronger while limiting my exposure in case someone continued to show interest. Plus there’s a chance, even if someone has a hand that he isn’t going to fold, that I’ll make a straight on the turn (though I’d still have to proceed with some caution).

Turn ($695) 9h. Villain 2 checks. What’s your play? Do you want to follow through with the plan, give it up, or maybe even check it back and make some fancy move on the river? If you do choose to bluff, what’s your target and how much would you bet?

Post your suggestions and questions here, and I’ll be back with my own thoughts as well as the results on Friday.

One point I want to emphasize up front about playing against tough/tricky opponents is that I’m going to try to avoid making exploitiable assumptions about how Villain will play. When you’re squaring off with really good players, I think it’s better not to assume they will “always” or “never” do something when there’s no structural reason for it. By “structural”, I mean something dealing with the fundamental mathematics of the game. So I can assume that Villain won’t call my 3-bet with 82o, because that’s both opening and calling would be fundamental errors, but I can’t assume that he won’t flat with AA because there’s no reason he shouldn’t some of the time.

As I talk about each street, I’m going to try my best to use game theory and other mathematical concepts rather than assumptions about how Villain is likely to play in order to get a sense of his range.

Pre-Flop

I hate calling raises out of position against good players, especially when those good players have really wide ranges. Even though I have an advantage in terms of card strength, I’m at both a positional and an informational disadvantage, and without raising I don’t push my card strength advantage. So even though 88 can be tricky to play in a 3-bet pot, it’s way ahead of Villain’s button opening range and I want to make him fold or pay with hands like Q9 and A6.

A raise also keeps the BB from coming in very cheaply, which I was more concerned about than a squeeze. Pre-ante, I’m a lot more likely to flat this, but when the pot is already kind of large, I’m going to put a premium on winning immediately when possible, especially with a vulnerable-but-probably-best hand. Although there will be plenty of tricky spots, I expect to have good equity and decent playability against his calling range.

My 3-bet risks 3000 to win 2300, so ignoring any equity in the pot, it has to get folds about 56% of the time to show an immediate profit. This means Villain should be raising or calling roughly half of his opening range. If he opens 50% of hands on the button, that would mean 25% of the deck. Of course we don’t know his exact opening frequency nor which hands exactly he’d choose to defend, but just to get a rough idea of how wide that is, this seems like a reasonable 25% of hands defend: {22+,A2s+,KTs+,QTs+,J9s+,T7s+,96s+,86s+,76s,65s,A9o+,KTo+,QTo+,JTo,T9o}

Nate and Leo Wolpert both raise good questions about the size of the 3-bet. Nate points out that a smaller 3-bet could still fold a lot of that air without bloating the pot as much. It would also make a 5-bet shove more profitable if that’s something I’m committed to doing.

On the other end of the spectrum, Leo points out that if I’m mostly concerned with pre-flop fold equity, then a larger size might be better: “Maybe it’s results-orientation, but the small preflop 3b seems like the kind of small mistake on an early street that not only prevented your opponent from making a big mistake, but opened the door for you to make larger mistakes (or at least have to face extremely tough/marginal decisions) on later streets.”

I think these are good suggestions, though I still don’t hate my size. I’m not wild about using different 3bet sizes depending on my hand, and for my 3bet range in general I kind of like a size that gets a fair number of folds but also encourages calls over 4bets. All in all I’d like to 3bet a depolarized range and that means I’d rather get called than 4bet.

Flop

Several of you correctly point out that this is a good spot for Villain to flat with some big pairs, and I agree, but I still think he’s going to raise them more often than not. Here’s a very rough range that has Villain opening 50% of the deck on the button, then 4-betting a 5% mix of monsters and bluffs and calling 20% (that ratio may be a little off but remember the size of my raise was engineered to induce calls over 4bets): {AA,99-22,ATs+,A5s-A2s,KTs+,Q9s+,J8s+,T7s+,96s+,86s+,76s,AJo-ATo,KTo+,QTo+,JTo,T9o}. Note this range contains a fair number of slowplayed big pairs and big suited Aces and is maybe even a little generous in that regard. Again, this isn’t meant to be a representation of his actual range, just a sense of how wide his range could be. I encourage you to put it into PokerStove so that you can visualize it better.

My 88 has only about 55% equity against that range on this flop. A bet certainly won’t cause better hands to fold, but it will be called by worse, and I’m quite vulnerable to overcards, so I’m happy enough just to get a fold from QTs as well. A half-pot bet with air would need to get a fold 33% of the time to break-even, so Villain should be calling or raising roughly two-thirds of the hands that see the flop. This is a range that has him continuing with any pair, any two overcards, and many of his gutshots (which also have at least one overcard to my pair: {AA,99-22,ATs+,A3s,KJs+,QTs+,J8s+,T7s+,97s+,87s,76s,AJo,KJo+,QJo,JTo}. I’m actually a slight dog to that range, though there’s additional value in making him fold hands like T9o and ATo that have good equity.

Turn

I couldn’t say exactly how often he’d call vs raise the turn with hands better than mine, but I don’t think it’s a great spot to slowplay somewhat vulnerable hands because the pot is quite large compared to his stack. In fact there’s some reason to think his value-raising and floating (as opposed to bluff-raising) frequencies are inversely proportionate, because both floating and value-raising are better if he doesn’t expect me to bluff the turn often.

What I’m getting at is that I feel pretty good about my hand on the turn, though I don’t see a case for betting. He’ll fold most if not at all worse made hands, and it won’t induce bluffs. There’s an important lesson here: even once you’ve decided you’re committed to the pot, it matters quite a bit how the money goes in. Here I’m much better off giving him a chance to stab it than just shoveling the rest of the money in myself.

Still, I’m happy to see him check. It further reduces the number of value hands in his range, because some percentage of his flop slowplays should be betting now.

Many commenters assume that Villain won’t check floats on the turn, but I think this is one of those exploitiable assumptions we should avoid making about a good player. He’s got enough weak hands in his flop calling range that he’d be really bluff-heavy if he bet them all on the turn, plus balance dictates that he preserve some weak hands for bluffing or getting there on the river. Think of it this way: if he bets all of his air on the turn, then he’ll either have no bluffs on the river or have to turn hands with appreciable showdown value into bluffs.

There’s some good discussion about this between eldodo42 and TaddisVonBaddis:

eldod42:

“His check-behind on the turn give us a treasure trove of information. He’ll fire the turn with most of his traps and most of his floats, so we can severely discount traps and floats, to the point where they don’t matter much anymore for our decision making (all IMHO, of course). Thus, after the turn action the majority of his range is middle-value hands. It is instructive to consider just middle-value hands when planning our river line.”

TaddisVonBaddis:

“I am torn here between eldodo’s conclusion of just middle hand strength from our villain or whether his range still includes some floats. If villain determines we aren’t folding here, why wouldn’t he jam any Jx hand or TT for value? At the same time if he feels we aren’t folding why wouldnt he peel a free river with those few floating hands? I’m not saying its a huge part of his range but I don’t think its to be eliminated completely if villain really is very good.”

River

Leo, posting as EMO MELTDOWN!!!, shares some interesting math in the comments. I haven’t reviewed his assumptions closely, but his conclusion is that shoving the river is profitable even if Villain never calls with worse simply because he so rarely has better. This makes me dislike any line that ends with me folding. It also points out the futility of bluffing, since any hand stronger than 88 will clearly be towards the very top of Villan’s range.

The main question to ask, then, is whether he’s more likely to call a bet with worse or to bet worse if checked to. Piefarmer is correct that the “Brokos Hand Reading Method” suggests Villain mostly has hands he wants to showdown cheaply, which should incline us towards betting.

Tricky players do things to subvert these simplistic hand reading techniques, though. I’ve already demonstrated why he ought to have more air than that method would suggest on a blank river. Tricky players are also capable of things like turning hands with showdown value into bluffs, something Villian should be especially inclined to do if he’s betting most of his air on the turn because otherwise he’ll have no bluffs on the river.

Finally, it’s worth nothing that I definitely want to value bet stronger hands than 88 that I might have in my range in case Villain checks back his 88 – TT. That means my checking range is often going to be folding or losing at showdown, and I’d like to get some more hands good enough to check-call in there to beef it up a bit.

Results

I checked intending to call any bet. Villain thought for a bit, checked behind, and berated himself when I showed my 88, saying that he should have shoved. This makes me think he did have something like 76 or 55 that he considered turning into a bluff. I didn’t tell him he saved himself money.

We’re on the last few hands of Day 1 of the Venetian $5K Main Event (which is nowhere near the money – about 50% of the field remains). Villain seems very good. He’s been appropriately active, which is to say not so aggressive as to assume he’s on any two when he opens the button but certainly opening a wide range. He seems thoughtful and capable of considering all of his options and thinking on a high level.

Hero’s image is probably similar, meaning that I’m not auto 3-betting late position opens but he’s also not going to expect me to have a hand that can call a shove every time. Neither of us has played much post-flop since I’ve been at the table, so any post-flop reads will be extrapolations from the above.

Blinds 250/500/50. Action folds to Villain on the Button, who opens to 1100 with about 2oK behind. Hero 3-bets to 3000 from the SB with 88 about 45K behind. My intention is to shove or call to a 4-bet if Villain shoves, though I won’t be too thrilled about it. I think that’s better than the alternatives, though. BB folds, Button calls.

Flop (7200) Jd 7s 3c. Hero bets 3500, Villain calls. My plan again is to call a shove or shove over a raise.

Turn (14200) 4c. Hero checks, Villain checks. Plan here is to check-raise all-in or call a shove.

River (14200) 2d.

Villain has roughly a pot-sized bet remaining. What’s your plan and why? If you bet, how much and what’s your plan if raised? If you check, what’s your plan for a bet that could be as large as the pot?

Post your thoughts, comments, questions, etc. here and I’ll do my best to answer them throughout the week. As I said, I’m happy to talk about spots other than the river as well. I’ll post results and my own thinking on Friday – hopefully by then you all will have changed my mind and I’ll have a better idea of what I should have done here!

I arrived at the Venetian DSE area, which is actually in the Palazzo, at the stroke of noon. I confirmed the start time with the woman who sold me my seat, because it sure didn’t look like a poker tournament was about to get underway. Six dealers sat surrounded by chip stacks at six tables, surrounded by a dozen or so empty tables. A few people milled about, but the tournament area was largely vacant.

I glanced at the information screen: I was the 26th player to register. Not much of a turnout, but the upside was that I didn’t recognize anyone else in the room, and none of them looked to be particularly good. Had I discovered some hidden gem whose value was unknown to all of the other professionals in Sin City?

I had not. The field continued to grow as players late registered, and the ones would couldn’t be bothered to show up on time looked to be consistently stronger than their more punctual counterparts.

Still, I felt pretty good about locking in a weaker starting table with my on-time arrival. Better yet, we would be among the last to break, so I could count on playing with these guys until I had all their chips and they were finally replaced by tougher competition.

I had Kings in the only significant pot that I played in the starting 50/100 level. I opened to 300 in the HJ, and the CO made it 750. We started with 30K, so I’m not looking to get all-in preflop. I also think that 4-betting is going to put Villain on alert and make it tricky to play my hand postflop since even in a 4-bet pot I won’t be looking to go to the felt unimproved. So I just called.

I checked and called a bet of 800 on an 842r flop. The turn was a 2, I checked, and Villain bet 900. Perhaps against his weak sizing I should continue slowplaying, but now I was confident enough in my hand to raise. I made it 3200, and he folded.

I didn’t play too many pots early on because the guy on my right was playing a lot of hands aggressively and badly. He’d run up a bit of a stack and I was just dreaming of how nice those chips would look sitting in front of me when the floor showed up to whisk him off to another table. Lovely.

It got worse though. The table didn’t break, but within an hour I too was moved to another table, one of the recently opened ones full of late registers. Probably every player at this table was better than every player at my last table.

There was again a really aggressive player, but this one seemed to have a much better idea of what he was doing. I had about 35K at 100/200, and he covered when he opened to 500 UTG. He got one call, then I made it 2K with Qc Qs on the button. Without hestitation, he 4-bet to 4500, the other guy folded, and I called.

He checked a Kc 9c 6c flop, and I was happy to check it back. I may, however, have made a mistake checking the 2c on the turn. You have to target some pretty weak hands, including non-flushes, in a spot like this, and against weaker players it’s probably best just to check here and look to get one bet on the river. This guy, however, may have correctly read this check, followed by a bet on a 5s river, as strong, because he tank-folded.

For the umpteenth time, a player who seemed to know what he was doing revealed himself to be a fish by running his mouth at the table. He had a strong New York accent and looked like he spent about three hours a day in the gym. After losing a medium-sized pot to one of many bad river cards, he told his opponent, “Nice river. If it had come a blank, I’d have busted you.” Then, turning to another player not involved in the pot, he said, “And your ass should be out the door too.”

Turns out he was referring to an earlier pot in which he’d not been a major player but in which this other player had won with a straight. Apparently the New Yorker had several outs to a full house, and had he made that hand, and had the other guy played his hand the same way, and had the other guy then paid off a river check-shove, said other guy would be “out the door.” I’m not sure where the “should” comes from, though.

New York stormed away from the table and quickly became the subject of conversation and laughter, which died down upon his return. “Somebody say something about me?” he demanded. “Were you talking about me?’ addressing this time specifically to the guy whose ass apparently should have been out the door.

“I said you were from the east coast,” which was the truth, if not the whole truth.

“I hope if somebody said something about me he would be a man and say it to my face, not whisper it behind my back like a pussy.”

“I just told you what I said. I said you were clearly from the east coast. Because of your accent.” There was some more back and forth, and the floor had to intervene when New York kept making threats.

After paying off KQ with probably just an A on an AKQxK board, he asked no one in particular, “This gonna be all day today?” Then he repeated the question. “This gonna be all day today?” Then he repeated it twice more, word for word.

Needless to say, I was eager to get into a pot with him. I overcalled one of his raises with J7s and flopped a flush on a KT8 board. He called 1200 on the flop and 1700 on a K turn, then snap checked back a fourth diamond on the river. I tabled my hand, and the dealer indicated the board cards I was using to make a flush.

Peering from across the table, New York demanded, “Put it over here. I wanna see too. One of those fucking days. Another 2500 down the fuckin’ shitter.” Then he tilt shoved Ace-rag over a raise for a stupid amount and sucked out on a better Ace. Then he pretended to tilt shove an even more ridiculous amount with KK and got called by a bad Ace that sucked out on him. That one he actually took pretty well.

Although I got off to a good start, I went card dead after the antes kicked in and just couldn’t make anything happen. The table continued playing aggressively, and I was nitting it up. The few times I tried making a move or even opening a less-than-premium value hand (ie 99 UTG), I got reraised by players who, despite the generally high level aggression, really would have had trouble being light. We’re talking cold 4-bets, UTG+1 3-bets, etc.

It’s one of those things where all signs point to strength but you have to wonder, since you aren’t seeing the cards, whether you just keep running into big hands or if you are getting run over. Then you finally pick up a big one of your own and get no action. One of those fucking days.

The one successful move I did make began with me opening JTs to 1100 at the 250/500/50 level. The player on my left, who’d just cold 4-bet the first light 3-bet I’d made all day the hand prior, 3-bet to 2400. I called.

We both checked a K84r flop. A Q on the turn gave me an open-ended straight draw, but with about 14K behind it was too much to shove, and I didn’t want to bet and get shoved on. So I checked, he bet 2K, and then I shoved to take it down.

Other than that it was a lot of patience and folding. I hung around with 20ish big blinds through the dinner break and most of the next few levels. The best hand I saw during that time was AKo, which the first time I had it ran into another AKo.

The second time, I made a small 3-bet and got 4-bet. Then the big blind cold 5-bet shoved. Had he been deeper, I actually would have folded, but as it was he had even fewer chips than I did so I shoved after the original raiser folded. The 4-better came along, and we all turned over AKo.

Then, with half an hour left in the day, the second most aggressive player at the table opened from the HJ. The most aggressive player called on the CO. I shoved AJo from the button. The raiser shoved and the caller called. Both turned over QQ, which was about the best I could hope to see, but I failed to get there. Somehow they just had it every single time. One of those fuckin’ days.

Betting

Gareth correctly identifies that Hero is more or less in a reverse implied odds situation with regard to Cliff:

This spot really sucks and the intersection of ranges with this board really sucks. So do the possible turn cards for villain’s ranges. We aren’t ever going to get two or three streets from Bax here. We aren’t going to check it down and be able to show down our hand. Pretty much every time the flop checks through I feel like we lose the vast majority of the time.

We’re out of position on a volatile board with a medium-strength holding that’s not likely to improve and not likely to get to showdown against a second-best holding in the hands of a tough player. He’s too good for us to try to play a check-call game, basically revealing the approximate strength of our holding and praying that he’ll let us show it down cheaply when we’re ahead. He won’t.

If we’re going to continue with the hand, it’s better to keep our range wider by betting. I still think we can be in OK shape against the Russian if he shoves, so betting will ideally get it heads up with him and get Cliff out from behind us.

The bet would not need to be large, because we have two objectives: (1) get Cliff out of the pot or find out that he likes his hand; and (2) get it in with the Russian now when we’re in the best shape against his shoving range. Even a small bet can provide a lot of information about Cliff’s hand because it leverages the Russian’s stack. Cliff has to assume a substantial risk of the Russian check-shoving, so he can’t call idly even if our bet offers juicy odds. He has to assume, once we bet, that we frequently have a hand good enough to call the Russian. The possibility of the Russian shoving also increases the likelihood that Cliff slowplays a strong hand that he would ordinarily raise in a heads-up pot against a single, deep-stacked opponent.

So if Cliff calls even a smallish bet, I think we’re beat often enough to give up on the pot. I’d fold if the Russian shoves into both of us (there’s a non-trivial chance that he beats us even if Cliff doesn’t). I’d also shut down and check-fold most turns and rivers to Cliff.

Check-Folding

All of that is if Hero decides to continue with the hand. I’m not sure that he should. Everything I said above about leveraging the Russian’s short stack applies to the pre-flop action as well. Cliff needs a good hand to cold call a 3-bet from a tight player in early position, especially with an aggressive UTG raiser sitting on a live hand and a stack that could easily shove.

A few people suggested that Cliff would have 4-bet AA or KK, but this is actually quite a good spot to cold-call those hands. For one thing, a cold 4-bet here would be extremely strong and might well drive out second-best hands as strong as TT and AQ. If he makes this play, he’d hope UTG would re-open the action but the Russian is short enough that it’s not a disaster if he sees the flop with a suited connector or something.

I don’t see Cliff showing up with suited connectors, and even medium pairs of the sort that could flop have flopped a set here are iffy though not impossible. It’s hard to imagine he would fold AK, but he might prefer to 4-bet it rather than cold-call. That’s a close one and it was one of the major sticking points for me in deciding whether to put out a little bet or just give up on the flop.

What I’m saying is that Cliff’s cold call looks extremely strong and given how unideal a situation this is for Hero already, I seriously considered just checking and folding.

Results

As an early subscriber to Poker X Factor, I watched a lot Cliff’s videos back in the day. It’s been years since I’ve seen one, so for all I know he’s changed his game a lot and my read that he “sometimes gets a little too tricky for his own good,” may be dated. I felt like I’d seen him make enough speculative calls in strange situations that it was worth taking one small shot at the flop, but I’m still far from certain that was good.

As played, Gareth called it almost exactly. I bet about 2400 (forget the exact amount) and Cliff went into the tank for a bit before raising to 9000. The Russian folded and went off to dinner, and then I tanked for probably 3 minutes before folding. Cliff showed me Aces, which I told him I had a feeling he had. He told me, “Nice fold”, which suggests he thought I was contemplating calling, but really I was thinking about whether I could make him fold a better overpair. I decided I couldn’t, because sets, straight, and two-pair simply aren’t an appreciable part of my 3-betting range in this spot.

Thanks to the stalwart few who commented, and sorry for a somewhat botched job on my part. I’m going to be more diligent about double-checking these before clicking “Post” in the future.

Edit: I’m such a spazz! Sorry I had JJ. Don’t know why I can never get the details right on these on the first try.

It’s the last hand before dinner break on Day 1 of the $5K main event of the Venetian Deep Stack Extravaganza. Here’s our cast of characters:

Russian (UTG, 9K) – Mid-20s Russian who has been very active and aggressive. He’s a smart player who knows how to use his image well. Probably knows who Cliff Josephy is but probably does not know anything about me beyond what he’s seen today.

Hero (MP1, 45K) – Me. Late 20s wearing hat and sunglasses. I’ve been extremely tight the last few levels but did show down A7o after 3-betting the CO from my BTN. In that hand I bet-called an As 8s 8d flop, then called bets on a Qs turn and 5s river to win the pot with my 7s. I was also a lot more active early in Level 1 when the table was still short-handed, so most likely I’m viewed as tight but capable of mixing it up.

Cliff Josephy (MP2, 75K) – Well-known live player who’s even better known online as JohnnyBax. He’s a smart guy who’s capable of a lot but sometimes gets a little too tricky for his own good. He generally seems to be more concerned about keeping tabs on his horses than paying attention or taking advantage of every opportunity at the table. He’s almost always on his phone as soon as he folds, and he sometimes leaves the table for several hands at a time to go talk to someone. He recognizes me but I don’t know how much he knows about me other than that I’ve been a successful MTT player for 5+ years.

Edit: Cliff corrected me that he never actually missed a hand. He frequently left the table but always dashed back to play his hand.

Blinds are 150/300/25. The Russian raises to 700, which is standard for him. I make it 1700. Cliff thinks for a bit before calling 1700. Action folds back to the Russian who calls 1000 more.

Flop is Ts 9c 6d. There’s 5475 in the pot. The Russian checks, so action is on Hero. What’s your plan and why? In addition to whether you bet or check, give us a general idea of how you’ll proceed in the following scenarios:

1. If you bet, what’s your plan if…

a) Cliff folds, Russian shoves.

b) Cliff calls, Russian shoves.

c) Cliff calls, Russian folds, turn is the 2c.

d) Cliff calls, Russian folds, turn is the Th.

e) Cliff calls, Russian folds, turn is the Kd.

2. If you check, what’s your plan if…

a) Cliff bets, Russian shoves.

b) Cliff bets, Russian folds.

c) Cliff checks, Russian shoves Kd turn.

d) Cliff checks, Russian shoves 2c turn.

e) Cliff checks, Russian checks Ad turn.

Post your thoughts and comments here. I’ll respond to comments as best I can throughout the week and post my own thoughts as well as the results on Friday.

I had a flight to leave Vegas on Friday, but I ended up changing it at the last minute to play the $5K main event of the Venetian Deep Stack Extravaganza. Although it was a smallish field, just shy of 400 runners, I was happy with the decision. It seemed like a soft enough field. My table at least had a few good spots all day, and I saw others around the room, and the structure was great. With only 40% of the field remaining after Day 1, the average stack was still about 80 BBs.

I got off to a good start in the first level then spent most of the day hovering around average. At the very end of the night I scored a great pot that catapaulted me up to more than twice the average.

Blinds were 300/600/50. Cliff Josephy opened to 1400 UTG, he got four calls, and so I somewhat reluctantly called with 86o in the big blind.

Flop JQ95r. Cliff bet like 4600, all four of the others called, and so I ran some math in my head and decided that I could just straight up chase a four-outer since all of my draws were to the nuts. I called after more than a minute of thought.

Turn 7 completed the rainbow (Cliff claimed that was the perfect card for me but I think I’d actually prefer to have a flush draw out there). In my experience people are too passive in multiway pots, and given that no one raised flop I didn’t expect a bet on a seemingly blank card. So strong as it was, I bet 10K. Cliff agonized a bit and folded – I figured he’d be good enough to get away from almost anything – but another guy raised to 35K. I moved in for 60K and stacked his 97, which in my opinion should have been an easy fold when I led the turn into five people.

I came into Day 2 in 4th place out of the 160 remaining players.

Long-time readers may recall a story I recounted from my first deep run in the main event, back in 2008. A player named Dan had just won KK > AA against a Jewish Hawaiian player who called himself “The HulaJew” with whom both Dan and I had been friendly all day:

As penance for the bad beat, Dan bought a shot of vodka for himself and Hula, which they downed just before the dinner break.

Dan, Hula, and I were all in Vegas by ourselves, so we decided to head over to the Rio’s Japanese restaurant together. On the way over, both of them were getting dozens of calls and text messages about the shot. Apparently Pokernews had found that funny and included a blurb about it among their online updates. Friends and family of both Dan and Hula also thought it was hilarious and were texting constantly to express their appreciation.

At dinner, the two of them kept up the drinking, splitting two bottles of Sake. I demurred. Dan was starting to get a little tipsy and tried to insist on paying for dinner as further penance for the bad beat, but we wouldn’t accept it. We compromised on a game of credit card roulette with Dan contributing two cards. The Japanese waitress initially did not understand that we wanted her to pick a card at random and was upset that three of us were trying to pay for dinner with four credit cards. Finally she figured it out and drew one of Dan’s cards, but was further confused when he cheered and announced he had “won” then proceeded to pick up the tab.

That story ended with Dan waking up in the hospital the next morning and hurrying back to the Rio to play Day 5 of the Main Event.

I continue to see Dan around the poker scene, and we always laugh when we run into each other. On Saturday, for the first time since 2008, we played together again. He was a lot better than I remembered him (not that he was bad at the time), but thankfully there were softer spots at the table so he hadn’t been picking on me much despite being two seats to my left. He was reraising other players relentlessly, though.

I’d been leaning heavily on the two players on my right as well, so when I finally picked up AKo, I was excited to reraise it despite the fact that one of them had raised from early position. It helped that there was a tight player in the big blind. I 3-bet it, and then Dan cold 4-bet me. I wasn’t thrilled about that, but this wasn’t a spot for folding AK either. I couldn’t find a good size for 5-betting small, so I just put him all-in for about 70K, which was roughly an average stack at the time (I began the hand with 160K). He looked unhappy but called with AKs and proceeded to run out a flush. The rest of the table grimaced on my behalf, but as I just laughed and told him, “You owe me a shot and a beer.”

He laughed as well but was ready to order them. “I’ll drink double. It’s only fair. Give you a chance to win your money back,” he offered, sounding serious enough that I felt the need to explicitly decline. It would surely give me an advantage if he started drinking, but I didn’t want to risk killing him. I take cynicism at the table only so far.

Our table broke not too long after that hand, and I changed tables two more times in the next two hours before finally landing back at the same table as Dan once again. He was once again on my left, but this time Men “The Master” Nguyen sat between us.

Dan was at the table with Men before I arrived, and also after I was eliminated, so most of these stories come via him. Here’s something he tweeted before I got to the table: “Just witnessed one of the highlights of my poker career. Men the master ordering a corona..tipping in change..then spilling it on himself”

Dan and Men actually had a little run-in that I believe probably began as an honest mistake but ended with Men being shockingly stubborn. Men called a bet of 12,500 from Dan on the river and lost. The dealer passed Dan the pot, at which point Dan noticed Men had paid only 12,100, using a 100-chip rather than a 500-chip. The two do look somewhat similar, which would explain why no one noticed the error until Dan received the pot. Once he pointed it out, though, Men claimed it was too late to prove or reconcile.

As it happened, Dan had few small denomination chips, and only a single 100 and a single 500. Thus, there was no way the proper amount could have been paid to him. He just sat there with an incredulous, goofy look on his face, as though to ask, “Is this really happening?” (it was so surreal as to be funny, and the amount involved was really not significant) as Men flat-out refused to pay what he clearly owed. Only after several minutes of arguing did Men finally pay up.

I lost a medium-sized pot with what may have been a slightly ambitious move. A pretty good short-stacked player opened for a small raise from early position, got one call, and I called with Ad 3d on my BB. The flop came 2c 2d 4c. I checked, the raiser bet, the other guy folded, and I put him all-in. He was short enough that the risk to me wasn’t huge, and my equity is good enough that I don’t need him to fold much to make this profitable. I can’t be sure that he would even fold like an AQ here, though, and I don’t think he was opening too light in that spot, so it may still have been a slightly -EV shove for me. As it happened he called with TT and won.

The very next hand I was dealt KK in the SB. The same player raised again, Dan called, and then an old man with bushy sideburns 3-bet it to 8500. I had about 75K in the SB. Against more aggressive players I could consider a small 4-bet here leaving room for them to 5-bet, but this guy wasn’t going to 5-bet light and would probably correctly interpret my raise as strong. I decided the best thing I could do was make a shove that would maybe look a little tilty. I couldn’t convince him I had 87s, but maybe he would believe I was spazzing a bit with AQ or something. Sure enough, he didn’t think long before calling with Queens.

His eyes weren’t too good, so he kept asking what I had when we turned the cards over. I was repeating “Kings” loudly for him, but he wasn’t getting it. What he did get, however, was a Q on the flop to eliminate me. I guess he later got some drama with Men as well, because the last thing I saw Dan tweet was

“Men the master is now on an epic drunk rant with an elderly gentleman. I really wish I could film this for you.”

I am 24 years old and I live in Henderson, NV. Following the shut down of service to US players on Pokerstars I decided to play a few live tournaments.  I instantly final tabled two Bellagio WPT $540′s back to back.  During one of those deep runs I was offered, by another player in the tournament, to join his team of players that are backed.  I had made out plans and set out a schedule of tournaments over the course of the summer only to find out that the backer of their team just went on $400k downswing and they are not adding any new players.

Now I am stuck in a bad spot, I am scrambling to find any sort of staking/coaching deal for the summer and I do not know anyone in the poker world….  Any help you could offer, even if just some words of advice, would be greatly appreciated.

My suggestion to this player was for him to focus on the games he could afford on his own bankroll rather than entering into a staking relationship that would have constrained his options. After hearing that he final tabled the first Venetian event and had a few other good cashes as well, I concluded that, “it looks like he’s going to be alright.”

How right I was. He recently got back to me with a pretty extraordinary success story:

I’m not sure if you remember me, but… I had originally emailed you asking for staking/coaching or just any advice that you could give me. I wound up having a very solid series without needing any kind of backing. After the series I moved up to Canada to maintain Supernova Elite status on Pokerstars….

I recently came home to Chicago to play live tournaments, for the first time since the series, at the Chicago Poker Classic. I won ‘Player of the Turbo Series’ (winning a car that I took $30k cash option for) and ‘Overall Player of the Series’ (for $50k in cash).

The combination of skills that I have obtained from grinding online, and my many years of dealing poker and playing live have made for a great mixture of skills that make me a beast in live tournaments. I’m absolutely giddy about the WSOP being just around the corner, and I want to take my game to the next level and maximize my chances of success and making a run at a bracelet.

I’ve been watching your training vids since I was a broke noob, and reading your articles and blogs as well. I really like the way that you go into such depth explaining even just a single hand of poker…. Again I ask for just any bit of advice you’d have for someone in my situation. Last year when I asked the same thing I was a good player playing with a limited bankroll. This year I am fresh off of 10 months of very hard work online, with a nice bankroll, and my confidence has me believing that I can win every tournament that I play.

I’ve already written back to him, but I want to post a bit of advice here. Obviously this player has had a ton of success recently, more than could be attributed to luck alone. In other words, he’s clearly a talented tournament player.

It’s important, however, not to get overconfident. He’s surely had more than his share of luck as well. There’s always room for improvement no matter how good you are, and even the best must work hard to stay on top of the game.

It seems like this player is taking the right message from his recent success: he has skill and talent that is well worth investing in. He’s taking the right approach by being inspired to play more and study harder rather than resting on his laurels.

As a blogger, I love hearing from people who have found my writing or my advice helpful. Hell, just knowing people read at all is nice. If you’re a reader, I’d love to hear your story: how you got into poker, how you’re improving, what you like most about the blog, constructive criticism, and by all means your proudest poker accomplishments!

You can leave comments here or contact me directly. Please let me know if you don’t want me to share your story, because I’m looking for a few more good ones like this to post.

For me my biggest problem was that I was always playing 9-12 tables. Because of this, I was making a lot of money but never really working on my game and improving. I think this is a problem that many mid stakes players struggle with as to improve and move up they most likely will need to sacrifice a little bit in the short run in order to progress as a player. I also found that playing heads up greatly improved my hand reading skills along with improving my game in blind battles and when playing OOP. Most of my success at the 5/10 – 25/50 level has come when I was playing 1-5 tables and truly concentrating on every hand instead of just going through the motions.

I often encourage students who come to me for 6-max or full ring coaching to try playing some Heads Up, particularly if they struggle with hand reading and thinking outside of the box.

This bit of advice, on the other hand, is either dated or just plain impractical:

I think when playing HU game selection is so key. Early on when I was putting up a huge winrate at HU I game selected religiously and for the most part just destroyed fish. Once you get into playing other good regulars you’re just looking at a variance nightmare which can often take tens of thousands of hands to iron out. I’d say for the most part just try to concentrate on playing fish or exploitable weaker regulars and you can maintain an extremely high winrate with relatively little variance but if you decide to play other good players expect 20-30 buy-in downswings semi regularly and a much lower winrate

Yes, it would be nice to play heads up all day long with fish at 5/10, but they just aren’t that easy to find. If you aren’t willing to play some decent regulars, it’s hard to find any action at all.

Overall a pretty good and interesting interview, though!

500/1000/100, I open complete 73o in the SB, Lauren checks.

Flop Ks Js Jc, I check planning to call a bet and bluff river. She checks behind.

Turn 7c, I check, she bets 3000, I call.

River 9d, we check, I show my hand, and it’s good. Owen comments on my playing 73o and predicts that I won’t be giving a lot of walks.

I open raise to 2400 with Ad 2d on the Button, Owen calls on the BB.

Flop Kd 9d 5c. He checks, I bet 3300, he calls.

Turn 8d, he bets into me 6400. This is close, but in retrospect I think a big raise to 24K or so is best (I have about 50K behind). He’s never getting away from any flush and may stack off with two-pair or worse putting me on a semi-bluff. However, I called.

River 2d, he check-folds for 9000 and tells me he had two-pair.

Last hand before table breaks, I open raise to 2600 with 33 in MP, prematurely balding Middle Easternish guy calls in BB.

Flop Ad Qd Qh. He bets 4000, I call. I put him on a Q or a bluff, possible with a flush draw. 33 is one of the worst hands to bluff catch with, but I think he’s going to play very predictably on the turn and I may even be able to bluff him off of a turned or rivered pair, so I call.

Turn 3d. He bets 9000, I call.

River blank, he check-calls 10K and looks sick when I show my turned full house. He told me he had a Q, which I’m sure is true.

This one I think I bungled badly. Against a guy who’s capable of hand-reading, bluffing, and thin value betting, I think a call is OK. Against a random live player, I should probably shove turn. He’s rarely bluffing, never folding a flush, and probably not folding trips. Failing that, I should bet bigger on the river, since he’s always either check-folding or check-calling with a Q. Probably 15-17K is best.

My new table was a lot tougher, with Andrew Robl, Paul Wasicka, and a few other solid players whom I didn’t recognize by name. The table also featured wild-haired backgammon legend Paul Magriel. I actually played with Paul on Day 1 of the PCA, and though I don’t think he remembered me, we had a little interaction there. I was wearing my Foucault t-shirt, and the dealer asked who the man on my shirt was.Since most people don’t know who he is anyway, I usually answer that question with “a writer I like”, unless I’m in a book store or coffee shop or something like that.

Paul, however, asked, “Which writer?”

“Michel Foucault.”

“I thought that was Foucault. I don’t much care for him myself.”

Looking Paul up and down, I answered, “Yeah, I figured if anyone at the table would know who Foucault was, it would be you.”

Anyway, at 600/1200/100, Paul opened in MP2 to 3400. He had less than 25K behind, so I made it 8200 to go with QQ on the Button. He hemmed and hawed and called. The flop came 9d 8d 3d, and he open shoved his last 15K or so. I had the Qd, but even without it, this would be an easy call. He showed me 98s for a flopped two pair, but with an overpair and a flush draw, I was still a slight favorite. I didn’t get there, though, and that one hurt me.

A while later, Paul open limped in MP1, and a decent guy who was almost certainly an online tournament pro raised to 3700 with 26K behind. I woke up with JJ and shoved in 38K or so, only to get called by QQ.

Next hand, the UTG player raised, and I was forced to fold whatever garbage I had. Hand after that, I was in MP1 and, without looking at the clock, folded T4o. Then, I saw there were only 2 minutes left in the level, and I realized I should have shoved any 2 before the blinds went up and cut even further into my fold equity. It turns out I would have been called by KQ and lost, but that’s not the point.

I spent 15 minutes on break, came back to 800/1600/200 blinds, and shoved in 7700 with Jc7c UTG+1 on the first hand. The guy on my left called, and it folded to Magriel who put the guy all-in for about 40K. After long deliberation, the first caller folded, and Paul showed Kc 2c. Pretty great spot for me, but the flop gave me nothing to work with, and a K on the turn sealed my fate.

I played some hands well, but failed to get full value from my monsters on more than one occasion. Overall, though, I just don’t think this one was mine to win. I ran good in medium pots but bad in big pots, and that’s just not the way to do it.

On the plus side, I got back to my room in time to late register for the $500 FTOPS main event, which I’m currently playing. Thanks to everyone who followed along and wished me well.

Flop Js Td 9s. Checks to me, I bet 300, SB calls. I think he can have any pair and even a few draws that I’m beating.

Turn 2d. He checks, I bet 900 expecting him to fold anything worse than a pair of Jacks that doesn’t also have a draw.

River 6h. He checks, I bet 1400 expecting him to fold most of his one pair hands. He calls with J9, which is fine.

75/150, I have been very tight but choose to raise to 450 with Jc9c in MP. Jon calls on my left, bad player calls on the CO, spazzy guy calls on the Button, blinds fold.

Flop Js Td 8s. Checks around to button, who bets 600. I call, the others fold.

Turn 6c, we both check.

River Qc, I check and instantly regret it. He’s probably never value betting worse and doesn’t need to bluff all that often. However, he probably calls a bet with lots of stuff, including any two pair and probably any Jack or better if I don’t bet too big.

75/150, I raise Qc 8d to 400 in MP3, Jon calls in the CO, everyone else folds.

Flop Kd Jd 5h. I bet 700, he calls.

Turn 9d, I bet 1700, he tells me he’d call if he had the Qd and folds what was probably QJ.

200/400, spazz open limps in MP, tightish player limps the Button, folds around to me, I check 76o on my BB.

Flop AA9 with no draws. I bet 800 and take it down.

200/400/50, I’ve been kind of active this orbit and raise to 1100 in MP with TT. Amnon calls in the CO, everyone else folds.

Flop Qd 2d 2h, I bet 1700, he calls.

Turn 2c. I bet 3600, he calls.

River 6h. We both check, and my hand is good.

200/400/50, tight-bad Asian kid raises to 1050 in MP, I call 33 on my Button, and the BB calls.

Flop Kd 9h 4h. Checks to me, I bet 800, Asian kid calls.

Turn Th. He checks, I look at his stack. He has around 9000. I think my hand is rarely good but he never has a flush. I bet 2000, he folds.

300/600/75, Dennis Phillips raises to 1650 UTG+1. I’m in MP1 with KcKd and about 24K chips. I consider flat-calling, but I don’t think DP is going to fold as often as he should to a 3-bet, and I also don’t think I’m going to induce a squeeze behind me, so I 3-bet to 4500. Folds to DP who calls.

Flop 9s 4c 3s. He checks, I think for a long time and bet 4000. He calls. Turn 4s. He checks, I think a bit and shove about 15K, he folds quickly. If I have the Ks, I think I check there.

Against a better player, I like the small flop bet. After calling pre-flop, most people aren’t going to fold an overpair, and I think they’ll usually check-shove if they don’t check-fold. They may do the same with something like AK/AQ. DP, on the other hand, is quite capable of calling once and folding the turn, so I probably should have tried to get a bigger flop bet out of him.

Early on, I raised 55 on my CO and called a 3-bet from a fishy player in the BB. I made a questionable call on a 932 flop, then turned a 5 to stack his KK.

The table kept getting tougher, with Amnon Fillippi and a few other solid players (but also Dennis Phillips) filling empty seats. A tight-bad player open limped for 300, I made it 1300 with QQ, Jon called, and Amnon shoved 15K from the Button. I reshoved without much thought but ran into AA.

I’d been playing pretty tightly, but at 300/600/75 I opened to 1600 with K9o in MP3. Jon called in the CO, and Amnon called in the BB. Flop came Kh Kd 6d. I bet slightly over half pot, Jon folded, and Amnon called. Turn 8h, he checks, I bet slightly over half pot again, 6400. He tanks and shoves about 20K, I call, he has Jd 5d. River Qd, and he doubles through me and leaves me at 24K.

I work my way up to about 28K when an aggressive younger guy opens to 2100 in the CO (blinds 400/800/100). Dennis Phillips calls on the Button, and I pick up AA in the SB. I make it 6900, kid 4-bets, Dennis folds what he later claimed was JJ, and I more than double up to about 60K.

A few hands later, I open to 2400 with JJ UTG+1. Dennis re-raises to 6500 with about 21K behind. I reluctantly fold.

Overall I had a tough seat at a tough table and what I’d consider below average luck, but I managed to come out of it with 51,400 chips. We started with 872 runners, and there are 510 left, so my stack is almost exactly average, which would be 51,294.

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